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ROSE, WARDEN Cert to CA 6 
(Celebrezze, Engel, 
v. and Martin) (Order) 
LUNDY Federa1;e Timely 
1. SUMMARY: The state raises four que s tions for review of 
the lower court's decision granting respondc n~ habeas corpus 
relief: (1) whether a petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254 
should be dismissed, without prejudice, where the petition 
presents several claims for relief ~t not a ll of them have been 
presented to the state courts; (2) whether habeas corpus reli e f 
r ~ I nc. I I,.,~ -1- . rec.~,N~. ;V\.~J ;,.,_ ~ r.-..,..,.,.. 1,~ .. :-,.ae... 
~-F +k ~-~-- <?~ t-1,~ Is+ ,.~~+141>1"1 htz.re... .. 
' &~ 
- 2 -
C was properly granted on the grounds of prosecutor ial misconduct 
an<:] an improper jury instruction when resp failed to object at 
trial and did not demonstrate cause and prejudice for this 
procedural default, the state courts overlooking resp's failure 
to object; (3) \'lhether the DC erred in granting habeas corpus 
relief without considering the entire state trial transcript, but 
only portions thereof; and (4) whet0er the lower courts erred in 
concluding that resp's right of confrontation was abridged when 
the state trial court limited his cross examination of a rape 
victim. 
2. FACTS: Resp was convicted in a Tennessee state court of 
rape and crime against nature~ The victim was enticed into 
resp's car by resp's fourteen year-old female companion, with 
C whom resp had been having sexual relations "for years," at resp's 
direction on the pretext of giving the victim a ride home. The 
three drove past the victim's home, however, and resp ordered the 
victim to disrobe. She did so, and was blindfolded with her 
brassiere. The victim was taken to resp's apartment, where resp 
forced her to drink some whiskey and then raped her. Resp later 
compelled the victim to perform fellatio on him, and various 
sexual acts with ·his fourteen ·year-old female companion. As soon 
as resp fell asleep, the companion fled the apartment. The 
victim could not do so, since resp was lying on her. As soon as 
resp rolled over, however, the victim fled t he apartment, hailed 
a passing taxi, and immediately reported hav ing been kidnapped 
and raped. Resp was convicted of rape and crime against nature, 
the latter offense being based on one of th e sexual acts resp 
' - .. ~... "'.. ... ..,.,. 
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forced the victim to perform with his companion. The convictions 
were upheld, in an opinion, by the Tennessee Ct. of Crim App. 
Cert to the Tennessee S. Ct. was denied. 
3. DECISIONS BELOW: Resp brought a petition for habeas 
corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254. The DC (Morton) described 
the petition as presenting four grounds for relief: (1) cross-
examination of the victim was unconstitutionally limited; (2) the 
prosecuting attorney was guilty of prejudicial conduct in making 
certain remarks in front of the jury; (3) the prosecuting 
attorney commented on the failure of the def~ndant to testify 
and (4) the trial court gave an improper charge to 
every witness is presumed to swear the truth. The DC explicitly 
found that the third and fourth grounds had not been presented to 
the highest court in Tennessee, and that there had been no 
exhaustion of remedies as to those grounds. The DC therefore 
declined to consider these claims "in the constitutional 
framework." He noted, however, that "in assessing the atmosphere 
of the cause taken as a whole these items may be referred to 
collaterally.". Resp's first claim for relief, which the DC 
concluded had been exhausted, was that the trial court 
erroneously restricted his co~nsel's cross-examination of the 
victim. The victim had apparently made statements to defense 
counsel prior to trial concerning sexual relations she had with 
various individuals prior. to the rape. Defense counsel had asked 
the victim how often she had intercourse wi t h specified 
individuals in certain periods, and the victim responded that she 
did not remember h0\'1 many times. Defense counsel then asked the 
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victim whether she had told him earlier the number of times that 
she had had intercourse. The trial court sustained an objection 
to this line of inquiry. The Tennesse Ct. of Crim. App. had 
.._~-------
ruled ~hat resp was not prejudiced by the restriction of cross 
examination, since at an offer of proof the victim stated that 
she did not remember what she had told the defense counsel. The 
DC held that this amounted to a denial of resp's rights of 
confrontation. The DC also granted relief on the basis of 
several instances of prosecutorial misconduct. The DC reviewed 
the~ and c~c-~uded, inter alia, that the prosecuting 
attorney had impugned the conduct of defense counsel, commented 
~------------~----~-------------------------on the credibility of the various witnesses, misrepresented the 
law to the court, stated in the presence of the jury that "the 
(' defendant's violent nature would be material in this case," and 
personally evaluated the state's proof. 
The CA affirmed by order. It specifically rejected the 
state's contention that the DC should have dismissed the habeas 
·---····--·------' ...____ _____ ~-~----------------
petition because it asserted some claims which the petr had not 
----·· ··---~---~------------ --------- ------------------·~ 
yet exhausted in the state court system. The CA cited two 
------~----.....~-----------
decisions adopting such a rule, Galertieri v. Wainwright, 582 
F.2d 348 (CA 5 1978) and Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807 (CA 9 
1976), and then curtly noted that this rule had not found favor 
in the Sixth Circuit and expressly declined to adopt it. TheCA 
then concluded that the DC had reached corr ect constitutional 
conclusions. Finally, it rejected the stat0 's argument that any 
constitutional errors could not be reviewed because of the cause 
and prejudice rule of WaimHight v. Sykes, 1 ,33 u.s. 72 (1977). 
- 5 -
.The court stated that Sykes did not apply since the state courts 
of ·Tennessee had not applied any state contemporaneous objection 
rule but had proceeded to consider resp's claims on the merits. 
4. CONTENTIONS: (1) The state contends that the petition 
---~ 
for writ of habeas corpus should have been dismissed, without 
- _., Jl t,. 
prejudice, for failure to comply with the exhaustion requirement 
-·- ---- --------------------,. 
of 28 u.s.c. 2254 (b): "An application for a writ of habeas 
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment 
of the state court shall not be granted unless it appears that 
-----------------~ 
.,__ _ 
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts 
------------~------------------------------------------
of the state. II Permitting federal courts to consider "mixed" 
habeas petitions containing exhausted and unexhausted claims 
jeopardizes the principles of federal- state comity. As the CA 
itself noted, there is a clear conflict in the -circuits on 
whether mixed habeas petitions should be dismissed. As the 
Galertieri and Gonzales opinions make clear, the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits have adopted the rule which petr urges. The issue was 
presented to the Court in Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59, 
63-64 (1974), but the Court decided the case on other grounds and 
did not reach the present question. The state argues that 
adopting the rule of the Fifth and Ninth Ci:rcuits would eliminate 
piece-meal litigation and relieve federal courts from the burden 
------------- .____-J of successive habeas petitions. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 
412 U.S. 218, 259-263 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). The rule 
would encourage prisoners to fullX develop all their claims in 
state courts before travelling to the federal system, thus 
serving interests in the administration of justice. See Stone v. 
I 
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Powell, 428 u.s. 465 (1976). (2) The state argues that the 
alleged instances of prosecutor ial conduct relied upon by the DC 
should not have been considered by the federal habeas court, 
since resp had not objected to the . prosecutor's statements at 
trial nor had he shown cause and prejudice excusing his failure 
to do so. The state argues that Tennessee has long operated 
under a procedural rule r equ iring contemporaneous object ions. 
(3) The state also argues that the DC should not have granted 
relief without reviewing the entire state trial transcript. The 
state had filed only those portions of the trial transcript which 
had been cited in resp's petition pertinent to a specific claim 
for relief. The resulting injustice was clear . . The DC, for 
example, held that the confrontation clause claim was aggravated 
(_ in that the state's evidence rested solely upon the credibility 
of the rape victim. However, if the DC had only reviewed the 
entire transcript, it would have realized that the rape victim's 
testimony \'las corroborated in all respects by the defendant's 
female companion who was an eyewitness to the crimes. (4) The 
state also argues that the DC erred on the merits of resp's 
confrontation clause claim. As the offer of proof made clear, 
the judge's decision to limit ·cross examination did not prejudice 
petr. 
Resp argues that claims in a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus which meet the exhaustion requiremen ~ can be considered by 
the court even though other claims in the p~tition do not do so. 
He argues that the exhaustion requirement should not be used as a 
blunderbuss to prevent the consideration o f meritorious federal 
" 
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claims. (2) Resp notes that the confrontation claim and the 
\"· prosecutor ial misconduct claim were pre sen ten to the Tennessee 
courts, which decided the issues and did not base their decision 
on the failure of resp to make a contemporaneous objection. (3) 
Resp notes that the state did not raise the question of the 
status of the trial transcript in its brief before theCA, nor 
did it in its main brief before the CA ask for a remand in order 
that the DC might consider the entire record. The state filed 
only a partial transcript, failed to request an evidentiary 
hearing, failed to assign the question of the record as error and 
cann<;>t now be heard to complain of an incomplete transcript. (4) 
Resp argues that his right to confrontation was, as the DC found, 
unconstitutionally abridged. The jury was entitled to observe 
the demeanor of the victim as she denied remembering making the 
statements to the defense counsel. 
5. DISCUSSION: The main question presented by the state, 
whether a petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted 
'-------· 
claims can be considered by a federal habeas court, is a critical 
---~-----
one in the administration of justice and one on which there is a 
sharp conflict in . the circuits. TheCA here offered no reason 
for rejecting the established rule in the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits other than that "such a rule has not found favor in the 
Sixth Circuit." The rule adopted by the Sixth Circuit encourages 
~ j . l the filing of successive habeas petitions and undermines 
v~ desirable finality in criminal cases. The rule which the state 
urges would encourage defendants tq present all their claims to 
I"\ the state court system before resorting to federal courts, thus 
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serving policies of comity recognized in 28 U.S.C. §2254 (b). All 
of. the societal values which Justice Powell noted had been 
subordinated by the extension of habeas corpus beyond its 
historic bounds, "(i} the most effective utilization of limited 
judicial resources, (ii} the necessity of finality in criminal 
trials, (iii} the minimization of friction between our federal 
and state systems of justic~, and (.iv} the maintenance of the 
constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is 
founded,~ Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 u.s. 218, 259 (Powell, 
J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.}, would 
be served by adoption of the rule of the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits. (2} The state's argument that Sykes . barred review in 
the DC because of resp's failure to object at trial does not seem 
meritorious, because the state courts declined to apply the 
Tennessee contemporanenous objection rule. The rule in Syke~ is 
based on the existence of an independent and adequate state 
ground in the failure to object, and if the state courts do not 
want to apply their contemporaneous objection rule, that is their 
business, and no independent and adequate state ground barring 
review can be said to exist. The state's other claims are 
largely fact specific, and not as significant as the critical 
question they raise concerning the availabi l ity of habeas revie\-7 
when unexhausted claims are presented. 
I recommend a grant. 
There is a response. 
1/10/81 
JBP 
Roberts Ops in petn. 
c..-·ourt ................... . v orea on .................. , 1 :1 • •• 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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FROM : 
!:•1 1rmtr ~~mrt t,f t!(<' ~1n;tdt ;· ; .. trs 
;:r~. · lli nl}ton, p. Qj. ~ll,?JJ.;3 
I1arch 12 , 1981 
La\v Clerks 
RE : , Eo se v. L u nt1 y (<]ran t2 d 
7./:D/81) -- -
Always on top of hot is s ues (though not 
necess arily h a ndling UH'm well---see my Jast 
circulation), the Vit_q_i_ni_~_La\·~ ~c ~iew h<1s a note 
in lhe works on t~e issue in this c a ~e . I realize 
it v10n ' t be arguP.d \111til next term , by which time 
this issue should he on the streets , but once 
again they ' ve asked me to send soMething a round . 
File it away for your successors ' (and your 
Justice ' s ) reading pleasure . 
I .-.-· .• . -
., 
ATTORNEY RROR AS "CAUSE" UNDER WAINWRIGHT v. 
SYKES: THE CASE FOR A REASONABLENESS STANDARD 
AFTER WASHINGTON v. DOWNES 
In Wainwright v. Sykes,1 the United States Supreme Court held that 
failure to comply with a state's contemporaneous objection rule forecloses 
federal habeas corpus review of a state defendant's constitutional claims. 
In so ruling, the Court left open a possible avenue to defendants who 
could show both "cause" and "prejudice" in connection with their failure 
to make a timely constitutional objection during thei~ trial.1 The Wain-
wright majority, however, defined neither "cause" nor "prejudice,"' and 
the Court has not addressed these issues in subsequent opinions. This 
doctrinal vacuum has troubled lower federal courts, especially when peti-
tioners assert attorney error as the cause of their failure to make a timely 
objection. 
A recent case from the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, Washington v. Downes,4 illustrates the problems that 
arise when a state defendant asserts lawyer error as the Wainwright 
"cause" for his failure to make a timely objection on a constitutional 
claim.' In Downes, Judge Robert Merhige ruled that a defendant claim-
ing such error must first exhaust• state habeas corpus remedies for . 
1 433 u.s. 72 (1977). 
1 See id. at 90-91. 
• See id. at 87 ("We leave open for resolution in future decisions the precise definition of 
the 'cause'-and-'prejudice' standard . . .. "). 
• 475 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
1 The defendant in Downes failed to raise a constitutional claim in a Virginia court and 
was precluded from raising the iasue on appeal by the state's contemporaneous objection 
rule. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:21. In pertinent part, this rule provides: "Error will not be sus-
tained to any ruling below unleBS the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the 
time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of 
justice." ld. 
• The exhaustion doctrine, codified in the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
(1976), is rooted in the doctrine of federal -state comity. See note 38 infra. The exhaustion 
doctrine provides that a state has the first opportunity to consider the federal constitutional 
claims that arise from a state criminal proceeding and prevents a federal babe&& corpus 
petitioner from avoiding or shortcut.ting the entire state adjudicatory process. See Darr v. 
Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950). See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-24 (1963); Y. KAMISAR, 
W. LAFAVE & J . ISRAEL, MoDERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1623-24 (5th ed. 1980); S. SALTZEURG, 
·• AJmRICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1220-21 (1980). 
According to the exhaustion doctrine, only after the state courts have decided the federal 
iBBue on the merits may the federal habeas petitioner litigate the issue in the federal courts. 
The federal habeas petitioner is required to exhaust fully only one avenue of relief under 
state law, 1ee Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) , but the state courts must have had the 
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416 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 67:415 
ineffective assistance of counsel 7 before claiming that the error satisfies 
Wainwright's "cause" requirement.' Judge Merhige dismissed without 
prejudice the defendant's underlying claim that her confession was co-
erced, thus effectively reserving the doctrinal question of the degree of 
lawyer error required to satisfy the Wainwright test. 
The opinion is open to alternative interpretations on the doctrinal is-
sue. First, the court's demand that an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim be pursued in state court suggests that the standards for ineffective 
assistance and Wainwright "cause" may be identical in this context. Al-
ternatively, the dismissal without prejudice leaves open the possibility 
that a lesser degree of lawyer incompetence might satisfy the Wainwright 
test. 
This note first examines Washington v. Downes. Next, it analyzes the 
policies underlying Wainwright v. Sykes and examines the possible alter-
natives for measuring attorney error under Wainwright. The note con-
cludes that a reasonableness standard of attorney error that does not nec-
essarily reach the level of a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance 
of counsel is the proper standard for satisfying the Wainwright exception. 
I. Washington v. Downes: A CRITIQUE 
In Washington v. Downes,• a state prisoner brought a habeas corpus 
petition pro se in a federal district court contesting the validity of her 
state court conviction. 10 The petitioner asserted four grounds for relief, ~ 
three of which the court dismissed with prejudice.11 The petitioner's 
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 272 (1971). The state court must also have had the opportu-
nity to decide the iasue on the same constitutional theory presented in the federal habeas 
corpus proceeding. See id. at 276-78. 
' The right to effective assistance of counsel in state criminal trials is a fundamental con· 
atitutional right. It was first applied to capital cases in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-
71" (1932), and was further developed in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). This 
right is grounded in the due proceas clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CaNST. 
amend. XIV, or in the sixth amendment, U.S. CaNST. amend. VI, as applied to the states 
through the fourteenth amendment. The standards for measuring what level of attorney 
conduct meets this requirement remain uncertain. See note 59 infra. 
• See 475 F. Supp. at 577 . 
. • 475 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
•• The petition was filed pursuant to the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
(1976). 
11 The three claims that were dismiased on the merits were (1) that the petitioner's con-
feuion was inadmissible because obtained while she was under the influence of narcotics; 
(2) that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (3) that the sentenc-
ing judge failed to comply with the terms of a plea agreement. The federal court dismiued 
the lint claim on the basis of legal precedent. The court dismissed the second claim because 
it found the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. See 475 F. Supp. at 575-76, 
678. The court did not consider the facta underlying the third claim, because the petitioner 
.. 
•, 
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fourth claim was that her confession was coerced. Because the petitioner 
failed to object to the admission of her confession on this ground at trial, 
however, her claim ran afoul of Virginia's contemporaneous objection 
rule.11 According to this rule, unless a party makes a timely objection to 
an issue at the trial level, the party is barred from raising a claim relating 
to that issue on direct appeal in the state courts.13 Similarly, following 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 14 a federal court usually will decline to hear the 
claim in a collateral proceeding unless the defendant can show a cause for 
failure to raise the claim and actual prejudice to his case.1 • 
In Downes, the petitioner sought to invoke the Wainwright cause-
prejudice exception to obtain a collateral determination on her fifth 
amendment claim. According to the petitioner, her failure to object to the 
introduction of her confession resulted from her attorney's advice, who, at 
least with regard to this matter, performed inadequately!• While Judge 
Merhige recognized that "the issue of ineffective assistance [was] raised 
as 'cause for the Court to review the coerced confession claim, and not as 
a claim in its own right,' "17 the court declined to consider whether the 
had pled "not guilty" and had received a trial and because the court did not find evidence 
of a plea bargain that caused the petitioner to waive her constitutional rights. See id. at 578. 
11 See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:21. For the relevant text of this rule, see note 5 supra. 
11 See, e.g., Berger v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 332, 333, 228 S.E.2d 559, 560-61 (1976) 
("Our requirement of timely objection would be meaningless and rendered a nullity if objec-
tions ... could be raised and considered for the first time on appeal."); Manley v. Com-
monwealth, 211 Va. 146, 149, 176 S.E.2d 309, 312 (1970) ("There is a general proceuural 
requirement in most jurisdictions that ... (a defendant] must take timely steps in the 
lower court, either through a motion to suppress the evidence before trial or by sufficient 
objection to the use of the evidence when offered at trial.") . 
The general rule in most jurisdictions is that an objection must be made at trial before an 
appellate court will review a question. This practice is either a settled rule of common law, 
see, e.g., Chugach Elec. Aas'n v. Lewis, 453 P.2d 345, 349 (Alaska 1969); Broitman v. Kohn, 
16 Mich. App. 400, 403-04, 168 N.W.2d 311, 313-14 (1969); Mattfeld v. Nester, 226 Minn. 
106, 124, 32 N.W.2d 291, 304. (1948), or a specific rule of court, see, e.g., IowA CoDE ANN. 
I 813.2 (West 1979) (Rule 10.3); Kv. R. CRJM. P. 9.22; MAss. R. CRIM. P. 22. 
If a claim is raised at trial and the defendant subsequently exhausts state remedies, access 
to federal review in a habeas corpus forum is available for constitutional questions. If a 
claim is not raised at trial, however, and the state courts would bar state review under a 
contemporaneous objection rule, both direct review of the constitutional claim in the United 
States Supreme Court and a federal habeas corpus proceeding may be precluded. See C. 
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK or THE LAw 011 FEDERAL CouRTS 542-49 (3d ed. 1976). See generally 
Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 1050 
(1978) {hereinafter cited as Forfeiture]; Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 943 (1965). If the state court actually considers the merits of the claim, however, it 
may be considered by the federal courts. See note 6 supra. 
. •• 433 u.s. 72 (1977). 
. u See id. at 90-91. 
11 See 475 F. Supp. at 577. 
, •• ~~ •1(1 ~' I d. 
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lawyer's advice amounted to Wainwright cause and instead stated that 
the petitioner might have an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.•• Al-
though the court recognized that the attorney's advice may have been 
based on "deliberate calculation" and, therefore, would not be a proper 
subject for either habeas corpus review in its own right or to show Wain-
wright cause,•• the court stated that "the advice may have been so in-
appropriate that it could only have resulted from 'neglect or ignorance 
rather than from informed, professional deliberation.' "10 If the latter ex-
plained the attorney's conduct, the court said, the petitioner could assert 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a state habeas proceeding.11 
The court therefore refused to take evidence on the issue and dismissed 
the petitioner's claim because of her failure to exhaust available state 
remedies. 11 Explaining its justification for dismissing the petitioner's 
. claim without considering the grounds for which it was offered, the court 
stated that attorney error which is raised as "cause" to satisfy the Wain-
wright requirement does not excuse the petitioner from exhausting her 
state remedies. According to the court, "[a] petitioner should not ordi-
narily be permitted to bypass state remedies by making a challenge under 
the cause exception. This result surely could not have been intended 
under Wainwright, which reserved the cause-prejudice exception for de-
fendants who, but for the exception, would be victims of a miscarriage of 
justice.•tt• 
Judge Merhige did not fully explain why the assertion of a cause excep-
tion "could not have been intended by Wainwright.'' At the very least, 
this conclusion appears to conflict with the express provision in Wain-
wright itself for an exception to its rule. Nevertheless, the court may have 
employed the exhaustion requirement as a means to prevent future plain-
tiffs from using the cause issue as a surrogate for their underlying claim. 
If, unlike the petitioner in Downes, a defendant asserted full ineffective 
assistance as his Wainwright cause, a court might take evidence and rule 
on the underlying claim to determine whether prejudice resulted from the 
attorney's conduct. •• A petitioner could thus obtain indirect federal re-
•• See id. 
•• See Satterfield v. Zahradnick, 572 F.2d 433 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 920 (1978) 
(stating that calculated trial decieion by attorney does not satisfy Wainwright cause 
requirement). 
" 475 F. Supp. at 577 (quoting Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978)). 
" ld. at 577. 
•• See id. at 577-78. 
11 ld. at 577. 
14 Some courts, including the Fourth Circuit, see Cole~ v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968) , require a showing of prejudice for ineffectiveness 
c:aMI before they grant the remedy of a new trial. This requirement is not universal. See 
~ . . ' 
.• 
: 0 · , : ' 
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view on the merits of his substantive claim in spite of his failure to com-
ply with a state contemporaneous objection rule. Alternatively, Judge 
Merhige may have required exhaustion to give the state courts an oppor-
tunity to examine, indirectly, the merits of the coerced confession claim. 
Having developed a record on the ineffective assistance issue, including 
the issue of prejudice," the state court would be in a position to decide if 
it should apply the available, though narrow, exception to the Virginia 
contemporaneous objection rule" and entertain the underlying claim on 
the merits. 
Finally, the court simply may not have wanted to take evidence on the 
issue of attorney error without the benefit of a record. The requirement 
of exhaustion will facilitate subsequent federal habeas corpus review on 
the cause issue by creating a full state record on the ineffective assistance 
claim. · 
Nevertheless, the Downes tactic of transforming a petitioner's claim of 
lawyer error into a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance is trou-
bling for several reasons. First, by requiring the defendant to assert invol-
untarily a sixth amendment claim before allowing litigation of the fifth 
amendment issue, the court effectively nullified a traditional rule that, 
where direct review in state courts is precluded, a defendant need not 
exhaust state collateral remedies on the same ground before petitioning 
for federal habeas.11 Second, this requirement functionally eliminates the 
Strazzella, Ineffectiue Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses,' New Problems, 19 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 443, 473-74 (1977). Some courts place the burden of showing lack of prejudice on the 
state. See, e.g. , United States v: DeCoater, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coles v. 
Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert . denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). Other courts have 
placed the burden of showing prejudice on the defendant. See Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 
407, U4 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976). 
.. Virginia requires a showing of prejudice to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance. 
See Slayton v. Weinberger, 213 Va. 690, 692, 194 S.E.2d 703, 705 (1973). 
.. The Virginia contemporaneous objection rule states that an objection must be raised in 
a timely fashion and with reasonable certainty in order for the issue to be litigated subse-
quently except for "good cause shown" or to enable the court "to attain the ends of justice." 
VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:21. See note 5 supra. It is thus possible for a Virginia court to waive 
compliance with the rule, Virginia courts generally apply contemporaneous objection rules 
strictly. Cf. Rust v. Indiana Flooring Co., 151 Va. 845, 860, 145 S.E. 321, 325 (1928) (stating 
in a civil context that "only questions raised in the trial court can be reviewed in this court 
• . . , unless the order or decree is void, upon the face of the record, for lack of jurisdiction 
or otherwi&e"). A search of Virginia cases revealed no instance of a Virginia court making an 
exception baaed upon Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:21. 
n See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953). Vir.ginia's contemporaneous objection 
rule, see note 5 supra, "provides that the Virginia Supreme Court will not notice an objec-
tion on appeal" unless it was raised below. Washington v. Downes, 475 F. Supp. at 576. 
Direct appeal an an issue where no timely objection was made would therefore be futile, and 
fedeal habeas is technically appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) (stating that applicant 
shall be deemed to have exhausted state remedies when he has no right under state law to 
. ', ~J\ 
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petitioner's direct access to a federal forum on the sole basis of the Wain-
wright exception. When and if the Downes petitioner returns to the fed-
eral court, she will bring two constitutional claims. If the Downes ap-
proach is followed whenever lawyer error is a factor in failing to comply 
with the state contemporaneous objection rule, the petitioner always will 
have to assert two constitutional claims to receive relief under one. 
Third, the Downes approach is potentially unfair to defendants who 
have no desire to litigate an independent claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. If the state court rules in the defendant's favor, the remedy will 
be a new trial.•• The defendant, however, may have been pursuing a fifth 
amendment claim to have certain evidence-a confession in the Downes 
case--excluded from the case. •• Requiring the petitioner to exhaust state 
remedies for a remedy he may not prefer, therefore, could be unfair in 
some cases. 10 · 
In addition, the Downes approach appears to be unduly burdensome to 
the defendant who claims his attorney committed something less than a 
constitutional violation in failing to raise a timely objection. In Virginia, 
at least, the state standards for effective assistance are considerably more 
lax than those applied in the federal courts.11 The defendant therefore 
may be required to go through a state habeas procedure on a claim he did 
not voluntarily raise, virtually certain that his claim will be denied. Thus, 
he will eventually return to federal court on another writ of habeas corpus 
to litigate the same facts he was prepared to litigate months or even years 
raise the questions presented). By, in effect, creating another constitutional ground for the 
petitioner's habeas petition, the Downn court frustrated her reliance upon the exhaustion 
doctrine as applied to her underlying claim . 
.. See Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360, 367 (8th Cir. 1968) (accused entitled to new 
trial if denied effective assistance of counsel). See generally Bazelon, The Defective Auia· 
tance of Coun3el, 42 U. C1N. L. REv. 1 (1973). 
" Where a confession is ahown to have been taken in violation of a defendant's constitu-
tional rights, the usual remedy is exclusion. See United States v. Carignon, 342 U.S. 36, 38 
(1951) ("An involuntary confeBBion is inadmissible.") . 
.. In a great many cues, of course, there is no functional difference between the various 
claims userted by a defendant petitioning for habeas corpus. Where time baa passed and 
evidence has grown stale, a new trial may be impossible, and the defendant who prevails on 
habeas will go free regardleu of the substance of his claim. 
11 Virginia courts adhere to the gro11 negligence or "mockery 'or justice" standard. See 
note 69 infra. According to the Supreme Court of Virginia, "(o)rdinarily one is deprived of 
effective 888istance of counsel only in those extreme circumstances where the representation 
is so transparently inadequate as to make a farce of the trial." Slayton v. Weinberger, 213 
Va. 690, 691, 194 S.E.2d 703, 705 (1973). When the petitioner asserts her claim in the 
Fourth Circuit, she will probably have an easier burden. The Fourth Circuit applies an enu-
meration approach which it has held is consistent with a "community standards" test. See 
note 59 infra and accompanying text. 
.•1 .. 
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before.11 
Finally, the procedural tactic employed in Downes sends ambiguous 
signals as to the proper standard to be applied in cases where attorney 
error is invoked to prove Wainwright cause. If the court is implicitly re-
quiring the petitioner to show ineffective assistance of counsel to demon-
strate Wainwright cause, it should have enunciated this standard and 
considered its implications. If, on the other hand, the court intends ulti-
mately to apply a standard that recognizes as Wainwright cause some-
thing less than constitutionally deficient representation, it should not 
have required exhaustion, because there is no state remedy available for 
mere attorney error.•• 
It is this final point-the proper standard for assessing attorney error 
under the Wainwright exception-that the Downes court so awkwardly 
avoided by its unusual procedure. The court could have taken evidence 
on the attorney's conduct, determined the legal standard upon which to 
judge Wainwright cause, and, if it found that standard met, considered 
whether the Wainwright prejudice requirement was fulfilled and decided · 
the case. Instead, the court required exhaustion of a constitutional claim 
that the defendant had not even raised. Because the cause issue will even-
tually return in either a later appeal by the petitioner in Downes or in 
another case, this note examines the alternative standards for judging 
attorney conduct for purposes of qualifying under the Wainwright excep-
tion. It is first necessary, therefore, to examine the policies underlying 
Wainwright v. Sykes. u 
II. EFFECTUATING Wainwright; THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR 
· · AssESSING CAusE 
A. The Wainwright Balance 
In determining whether the degree of attorney misfeasance necessary to 
constitute Wainwright cause should be identical with the showing neces-
sary to establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel or 
whether a lesser showing should suffice, the rationale underlying the 
Wainwright decision must be considered. Wainwright culminates a line 
11 The aame situation could arise for a defendant who claims full ineffective assistance, ao 
long as the atandard for enforcing this right is stricter in the applicable federal circuit than 
in the state courts. Indeed, only if the standards were identical in both forums and if the 
petitioner prevailed on the claim at the state level would the Downes procedure seem to 
serve the defendant's interests. Even in this case the defendant may receive an unpreferred 
remedy. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra . 
.. See generally note 31 supra . 
.. 433 u.s. 72 (1977). 
. ' 
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of Supreme Court cases11 dealing wi th the availability of federal habeas 
corpus review for prisoners who failed to raise their constitutional claims 
at trial and who consequently were precluded from raising their claims on 
direct review because of state contemporaneous objection rules. 
The Court in Wainwright implicitly balanced the competing interests 
of the defendants in obtaining federal review against those of the state 
and federal judiciaries in limiting review. On the petitioner's side, his 
claim to federal habeas corpus turns on the need for supervision of state 
enforcement of federal rights. In a habeas corpus proceeding, the federal 
judge is relatively free of the pressure that a state judge may feel to en-
force the substantive law of the state by according precedence to factual 
guilt over any alleged constitutional infractions ... Additionally, a federal 
forum facilitates uniform application of federal constitutional law.17 
On the other hand, federal deference to state procedural rules serves 
the interests of federal-state comity.•• Giving effect to a state contempo-
'" See, e.g., Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) ("considerations of comity and 
federalism" require that federal courts give the same effect to corresponding state proce· 
dural rules when asked to overturn criminal convictions): Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 
233 (1 973) (FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2) requires showing of "cause" to overcome procedural 
default by federal .prisoner'a counsel); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (review available 
absent a deliberate bypua by defense counsel) . 
.. See Tague, Federal Habeas Corpw; and Jneffectiue Representation of Counsel: The 
Supreme Court Ha1 Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1, 38 n.198 (1978) : Developments in the 
Law-Federal Habeas Corpw, 83 HARV. L. Rr:v. 1038, 1057-62 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
FedP.ral Habeas Corpu1). 
"' See Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 36, at 1061. 
'" See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-90 (1977). Comity in federal-state relation· 
ships involve~~ a "proper . respect for state functions .. . (and) the belief that the National 
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their 
aeparate functions in their separate waya." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Al-
though a federal court may have the power to hear a case, it may, in the interests of comity, 
abstain from reviewing matters already decided by a state court. In actions in which federal 
jurisdiction ia baaed on diversity of citizenship and the federal court would thus apply state 
law, considerations of comity may persuade the federal court to defer to a state court when 
the matter involves a political interest of the state. See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. \', 
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959) (federal action involving eminent domain post· 
poned pending state court determination because subject "intimately involved with sover-
eign prerogative"); Hawks v. Hamill , 288 U.S. 52 (1933) (federal courts will not interfere 
with the activity of state officers where the rights asserted by plaintiff are strictly local) . See 
generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WEt:HSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 998-1005 (2d ed. 1973). 
A defendant seeking review of a state criminal conviction by petition for a writ of habeas 
corpWI in federal court implicates the doctrine of comity. In this context, the doctrine re-
flect. the principle that federal courts should not review state court convictions when the 
petitioner haa an adequate remedy at state law. See Douglas v. City of Jeannettee, 319 U.S. 
157 (1943). Thus, federal courts will review state convictions only when the state's proce-
;. . dur• cannot adequately protect the petitioner's constitutional ri~hts. See Ex parte Young, 
, ...... ~,.,, ... 't\ .·l 
Wl.L .. P<Oii_, . ... . 1 ,, I\; 
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raneous objection rule in federal court also enhances both the finality of 
convictions and judicial efficiency ... Requiring a timely objection to the 
introduction of constitutionally defective evidence diminishes any incen-
tive on the part of the defendant to delay asserting his constitutional 
clnims.40 Additionally, timely objections facilitate consideration of the 
constitutional issue and the underlying facts at a time when the evidence 
is still fresh. 41 
The Supreme Court resolved these competing considerations by an-
nouncing that state procedural rules are an adequate ground for barring 
federal review, but that the petitioner may overcome this bar by estab-
lishing both cause for his failure to comply with the procedural rules and 
prejudice to his case.41 The Court felt that this cause-prejudice exception 
would preserve a federal forum where necessary to prevent a "miscarriage 
of justice. "41 
Three overriding policies, therefore, inform the Wainwright· decision: 
comity between state and federal courts, judicial efficiency, and the ren-
dering of just decisions in specific cases. In determining which standard 
for attorney error to apply in cases invoking the Wainwright exception, 
courts should therefore attempt to implement, to the greatest degree pos-
sible, each ~f these three concerns. · 
B. Ineffective Assistance as the Standard For Wainwright Cause 
A recent Supreme Court trend toward restricting access to federal 
habeas corpus•• suggests that it may be consistent with cu;rent judicial 
policy to require that the attorney error presented to show Wainwright 
cause also amounts to sixth amendment ineffective assistance. In the 
context of procedural default, the Supreme Court's decision in Fay v. 
209 U.S. 123 (1908). The concern for comity underlies the statutory requirement that the 
petitioner e.r.hauat state remedies before obtaining access to the federal courts on a habeas 
petition. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). See also note 6 
supra . 
.. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-90. 
•• See id. at 90. The majority's reasoning was sharply criticized by Justice Brennan, see 
id. at 103-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and others, see, e.g., Tague, supra note 36, at 43-45; 
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 Huv. L. REv. 70, 217-18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
Supreme Court, 1976]. 
" See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88 . 
.. See id. at 87, 90-91. 
.. /d. at 91. 
•• For commentary reflecting on this trend, see Forfeiture, supra note 13, at 1067-70; 
Michael, The "New" Federalism and the Burger Court's Deference to the States in Federal 
Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 64 IowA L. REv. 233 (1979); Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. 
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Noia" marked the most expansive approach to the availability of federal 
habeas corpus for petitioners whose substantive claims were precluded by 
state procedural rules. In this case, the Supreme Court held that "the 
doctrine under which state procedural defaults are held to constitute an 
adequate and independent state law ground barring direct Supreme 
Court review is not to be extended to limit the power granted the federal 
courts under the federal habeas statute."48 Consequently, the Court con-
cluded that, absent a deliberate bypass," a state procedural bar did not 
preclude federal habeas corpus review of the petitioner's constitutional 
claim. 
Subsequent cases have limited the scope of this decision. In Davis v. 
United States,•• for example, the Supreme Court determined that the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a showing of "cause" before 
a federal prisoner may overcome a procedural default,41 and in Francis v. 
Henderson, 10 the Court ruled that "considerations of comity and federal-
ism•••• require that federal courts give the same effect to corresponding 
state procedural rules when they are asked to overturn criminal convic-
tions. Finally, the Court in Wainwright endorsed the concept of a state 
procedural rule ordinarily constituting an independent and adequate 
state procedural ground precluding federal habeas corpus review. 
The Supreme Court's restrictive approach to fec.eral habeas corpus is 
illustrated most vividly in another context in Stone v. Powel/. 11 In this 
caae, the Supreme Court ruled, in part upon principles of federalism,•• 
that a petitioner could not present his fourth amendment claim on fed-
eral habeas corpus review if he had an "opportunity for full and fair liti-
gation" of the claim in the state court.14 While the Supreme Court's lan-
guage in Wainwright does not sweep as broadly as Stone, it may be 
consistent with recent Supreme Court decisions for a federal court to read 
the Wainwright exception in the most restrictive manner. This narrow 
reading argues in favor of employing the sixth amendment ineffectiveness 
•• 372 u.s. 391 (1963). 
"ld. at 399. 
"' ld. at 438. The Court said that relief could be denied if the "habeas applicant, after 
consultation with c;ompetent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent 
the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strate-
gic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-paasing of 
1tate procedures." Id. at 439 . 
.. 411 u.s. 233 (1973). 
•• See id. at 242. 
M 425 U.S, 536 (1976), 
•• /d. at 541. 
•• 428 u.s. 465 (1976). 
" See id. at 493-94 & n.35. 
'" /d. at 494. 
1981] Attorney Error 425 
standard in determining the degree of attorney error necessary to estab-
lish Wainwright cause. 
Nevertheless, the application of such a standard raises potential 
problems. First, it may be unduly harsh on defendants whose cases are 
prejudiced by attorney error that falls short of being constitutionally defi-
cient. A constitutional inquiry into an attorney's conduct may focus upon 
the attorney's entire performance during his representation.611 The peti-
tioner asserting Wainwright cause, however, may have only a single in-
stance of lawyer error to rely upon. Unless this single event so affected 
the lawyer's representation as to render it "ineffective," the petitioner 
will have no opportunity to litigate either the "prejudice" limb of the 
Wainwright test or the merits of his claim. This could lead to the very 
"miscarriage of justice" the Wainwright exception sought to avoid." 
Moreover, requiring such an overall failure by the attorney before federal 
habeas review is allowed would also seem to place an unrealis~ic burden 
on a defendant to recognize and control attorney decisions which 
prejudice his case.17 
Additionally, requiring a defendant to prove full ineffective assistance 
of counsel forces him into the anomalous position of having to prove two 
constitutional violations in order to receive the remedy ftir a single viola-
tion. This burden may place such a disincentive upon the assertion of the .. 
Wainwright exception as to eliminate it altogether in cases involving at-
torney error." Where a separate exhaustion process is required, as was 
the case in Downes, the value of judicial efficiency will also be impaired 
.. The standards for judging ineffective assistance vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
See note 59 infra. Additionally,· some testa focus more upon the attorney's conduct of the 
entire trial, while others examine specific inatances of attorney failure. See Strazzella, aupra 
note 24, at 472 . 
.. The analysis of this problem is complicated by the fact that both the ineffective assis-
tance claim and the Wainwright cause claim require proof of prejudice. See note 24 supra. 
Because prejudice will only exist where the constitutional claim overlooked by the attorney 
has merit, the chances are that, regardless of the formal analysis adopted, the Wainwright 
exception will only apply to cases where ineffective assistance exists. A lesser Wainwright 
cauae standard, however, allows the federal court to take evidence on the issue of lawyer 
error without requiring exhauation and may make a substantive difference where the stan-
dard for ineffective assistance requires analysis of the entire performance of the attorney. 
" See United States v. Brown, No. 77-2106, slip op. at 11 (D.C. Cir. March 21, 1980) 
(stating that moat defendants lack the legal sophistication to monitor their attorney's 
performance) . 
.. It is also possible that identical standards for Wainwright cause and ineffective assis-
tance would preclude defendants from raising the ineffectiveness claim separately once they 
loet on the cause issue. Rule 9 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United 
State& District Courts states: "A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge 
finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination 
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because both the state and federal forums will be asked to litigate a ques-
tion upon which they may have differing or conflicting standards." In-
deed, even among federal courts the actual application of an ineffective 
assistance standard for cause has produced varying results.•0 
.. Courta generally apply one of three standards to determine whether counsel's perform· 
ance meets constitutional requirements: the "mockery of justice" test, the "reasonable law-
yer" test, and the "community standards" test. See generally Strazzella, note 24 1upra. 
While many states, including Virginia, 1ee note 31 1upra, apply the mockery standard, most 
federal courta use either the reasonable lawyer or community standards teats. Three circuits 
follow the reasonable attorney test. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 
1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 
(6th Cir. 1974); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974). Seven circuits adhere to the 
community standards test. See, e.g., Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 
445 U.S. 945 (1980); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1978); Marzullo v. 
Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (~978); Uniied States v. 
Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976); United States ex rei. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973), ,Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970) (en bane). One circuit appar-
ently continues to apply the mockery of justice standard. See Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 
F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977). The Supreme Court has not spoken 
on the ill8ue, see Marzullo v. Maryland, 435 U.S. 1011, 1011 (1978) (White, J ., diSBenting 
from denial of certiorari), but aome courts have taken dicta from McMann v. Richardson, 
397 U.S. 759 (1970), as the basis for the community standards test. In McMann the Court 
atated that the relevant inquiry for examining an attorney's performance in the context of a 
guilty plea was whether counsel's advice was "within the range of competence demanded of 
attorneys in criminal cases." Id. at 771 . . 
.. For examples of the manner in which lower courts have viewed ineffective assistance of 
counael claims as satisfying the Wainwright cause requirement, see Boyer v. Patton, 579 
F.2d 284, 286-89 (3d Cir. 1978); Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876, 879-80 (5th Cir. 
1978); Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 130 n.6, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1977). A typical example 
of current case law is the Fifth Circuit decision in Sincox. v. United States, 571 F.2d 876 (5th 
Cir. 1978), which demonstrates that derelictions leBB serioua than a mockery of juatice may 
establish cauae. In Sincox , the court noted an earlier decision that ".viewed the Wainwright 
rule as juxtapo11ing the 'cause' uception with prevention of a 'miscarriage of justice.'" I d. at 
880 (citing Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506, 511 (5th Cir. 1977)). The court found ineffective 
aasiatance of counael and Wainwright cause where the defense counsel did not object at trial 
and did not appeal a conviction by a nonunanimous jury, despite the defendant's requests 
that he so appeal. See id. at 879-80. 
There ia a considerable lack of consensus in these situations, even within the same circuit. 
In Arnold v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 964, 971 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 
(1976), the Fifth Circuit, construing the Florida contemporaneous objection rule, held that a 
failure to object by a lawyer who was providing constitutionally effective representation but 
who, nevertheleBB, had failed to "exercise reasonable diligence" did not amount to sufficient 
cause to come within the Wainwright exception. In Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 
1977), anoth~r Fifth Circuit panelauggested that an attorney's failure to object to incompe· 
tent evidence when he "either ignored the grounds for objection or . . . did not comprehend 
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C. The Reasonableness Standarq for Attorney Error As Wainwright 
Cause 
A standard granting federal habeas review under the Wainwright 
cause-prejudice exception for those petitioners whose attorneys acted un-
reasonably with regard to the petitioner's particular claim of prejudicial 
error would take into account both the petitioner's interest in access to a 
federal forum and the interests furthered by limiting such access. While 
trial tactics and reasonable conduct would not constitute cause under this 
proposed standard, the petitioner would not have to show ineffective as-
sistance of the degree necessary to amount to an independent constitu-
tional violation. Although this standard, which focuses on the reasonable-
ness of the attorney's conduct in failing to advise his client of the need to 
assert the particular claim in accordance with the state contemporaneous 
objection rule, resembles the reasonable attorney standard81 applied in 
sixth amendment ineffective assistance of counsel cases, its focus is much 
narrower. 
The traditional reasonable attorney standard for sixth amendment pur-
poses examines the attorney's entire performance in representing his cli-
ent.•• The reasonableness standard for purposes of establishing Wain-
wright cause would instead focus on the specific error committed by the 
petitioner's counsel. The test would be whether, in light of the specific 
circumstances surrounding the single act of nonobjection, the attorney 
acted reasonably. This standard may overlap with ineffective assistance 
in some cases, particularly where one major attorney error is the basis of 
the allegation· of Wainwright cause. In situations where the standards do 
not overlap, however, the proposed standard allows the petitioner to as-
sert the attorney error · as Wainwright cause and, if the petitioner can 
demonstrate that the error prejudiced his case, the federal court can rule 
on the underlying claim. 
Two circuits that have recently addressed the issue of the level of attor-
ney error necessary to satisfy the Wainwright cause requirement have 
adopted a similar approach." These courts found that an ineffective as-
sistance standard focusing on whether an attorney was "sufficiently com-
petent overall"" is too generalized to protect adequately the petitioner's 
constitutional rights under Wainwright.•• In Tyler v. Phelps,•• the 
•• See note 59 supra. 
•• See Tague, supra note 36, at 8-13. 
" See United States v. Brown, No. 77-2106 (D.C. Cir. March 21 , 1980); Tyler v. Phelps, 
622 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1980). ' 
.. Tyler v. Phelps, 622 F.2d at 178. 
" See id.; United States v. Brown, No. 77-2106, slip op. at 11 (D.C. Cir. March 21, 1980) . 
.. 622 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1980). 
-------.c ., 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed that, while 
an attorney's performance might not violate sixth amendment standards, 
his erroneous failure to object might satisfy the Wainwright cause re-
quirement." Similarly, in United States v. Brown," the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that binding 
a defendant to the effects of his "generally competent" attorney's failure 
to present a substantial claim "would be a sen'.!eless penalty in most cases 
because most defendants lack the legal sophistication to monitor their at-
torney's performance!'" 
The unreasonable error standard is consistent with the Wainwright de-
cision.70 It serves the interests of justice by allowing federall'eview of the 
underlying constitutional violation without requiring the petitioner to 
prove a second constitutional violation before asserting the first. More-
over, the proposed standard sufficiently accounts for the judicial interest 
in providing federal habeas corpus review without violating the principles 
of federal-state comity. Under the unreasonable error standard, the peti-
tioner still must make a substantial showing of prejudice before the court 
may examine his underlying claim. Thus, . the rule maintains the high de-
gree of deference to state law that Wainwright requires. 
Finally, the unreasonable error standard allows the federal court to 
take evidence on the issue of Wainwright cause without the burdensome 
and often futile exercise of exhausting state remedies for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. The interest in judicial economy is therefore served. 
If this standard is adopted in the Fourth Circuit, then the Downes ap-
proach of requiring exhaustion should apply only when the petitioner as-
serta, as an independent claim, an allegation of constitutionally ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. If the claim is of simple lawyer error, the court 




The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
employed a novel approach in Washington v. Downes when confronted 
with a federal habeas corpus petition that asserted attorney error to 
demonstrate Wainwright cause. The Downes court effectively trans-
formed the petitioner's assertion of cause into a claim of constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel and dismissed the claim because the peti-
tioner had not exhausted her state habeas corpus remedies. The court 
., See id. at 177-78 . 
.. No. 77-2106 (D.C. Cir. March 21, 1980) . 
.. ld. at 11. 
,. See Supreme Court, 1976, 1upra note 40, at 219-20. 
i ' 
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thereby avoided determining the level of attorney error necessary to es-
tablish Wainwright cause. 
This note has explored both the practical and theoretical implications 
of Downes, concluding that, in framing a standard for determining 
"cause" under Wainwright v. Sykes, courts should seek to implement the 
policies of comity, judicial efficiency, and justice. These policies militate 
in favor of adopting a Wainwright cause standard that focuses on the 
reasonableness of the attorney's advice that resulted in the petitioner's 
failure to adhere to the requirements of the state contemporaneous objec-
tion rule. This standard will further the interests of comity because a rig-
orous showing of prejudice will still be required. S~cond, judicial effi-
ciency will be enhanced by allowing a petitioner . to assert the error 
without a lengthy state habeas proceeding on a claim broader than the 
one he wishes to assert. Finally, the ends of justice will be better served 
by permitting the petitioner to assert an underlying constitutional claim 
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Resp's counsel D. ShanncnSmith, requests appointment as counsel 
for resp. On Feb. 23, the Court granted cert and granted resp leave 
to proceed ifp. Applicant was appointed by the CA 6 to represent 
resp on appeal. Applicant is a 1971 _ graduate of the Salmon P. Chase 
College of Law and a member of this Court's bar. 
Th~re is no response. 
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Question Presented 
The main question in this case is whether a habeas 
petitioner's failure to exhaust all his claims in state court 
should result in the dismissal even of those claims that he has 
exhausted under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The case also involves 
potentially important questions about the "cause and prejudice" 
'-· 
doctrine and about the deference due to state court findings of 
"harmless error." Further issues are raised but should 
probably not be reached by this Court. 
Following the briefs, this memo is divided into four 
sections. The sections vary greatly in length, the differences 
reflecting my judgment of the relative complexity and 
importance of the questions presented. 
I. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES 
In his federal habeas petition, respondent Lundy asserted 
four grounds for relief. He had previously presented two in 
the state courts, thus exhausting his state remedies with 
regard to those two claims. Lundy also sought habeas relief on 
the basis of two claims that he had --- not presented for adjudication by the courts of Tennessee. Lundy thus filed a 
"mixed" petition--a petition that included both "exhausted" and 
"unexhausted" claims. 
Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit determined ~C:. g. 
to 
C/1, 




Dismissal of the unexhausted claims was ~ 4_ 
Neither purported to consider 
-1-w-o 
plainly dictated by the plain language of 28 u.s.c. § 2254; the itq~kJ._ ... , 
circuits are unanimous that unexhausted claims should not ~ 
ordinarily be considered. (The rule requir/ ing exhaustion oft~, 
state remedies has a number of exceptions. None is relevant u.u, _ 
here.) ~~ 
The decision to review the exhausted claims was 
consistent with the view of a clear majority of the circuits. 
"·· ' 
3. 
Only two circuits currently require the dismissal of all -~
claims in a mixed petition. There seem to be three general 
lines of ive circuits have held that, in the 
absence of special circumstances, district courts should 
routinely consider the exhausted claims included in a mixed 
petition. See Katz v. King, 627 F.2d 568, 574 (CA 1 1980); 
Levy v. McCann, 394 F.2d 402, 404 (CA2 1968); United States ex 
rel Boyance v. Myers, 372 F.2d 111, 112 (CA3 1967); Hewett v. 
North Carolina, 415 F. 2d 1316, 13 20 (CA4 1969) ; Triplett v. 
Wyrick, 549 F.2d 57, 59 (1977)~hree circuits have declared 
no rule, but have reviewed appeals from merits decisions on 
mixed petitions. See Meeks v. Jago, 548 F.2d 134 ~ 1976), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977); Brown v. Wisconsin State 
Dept. of Public Welfare, 457 F.2d 257 @ 1972); Smith v. 
Gaffne:~:, 462 F. 2d 663 6 1972) ?i>only two, the Fifth and 
the Ninth, require the dismissal of all questions in all mixed 
petitions • 
./ 
(en bane) ; 
See Galtieri v. Wainright, 582 F.2d 358~ 1978) 
Gonzalez v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807 e=vl976). The 
petitioner asks this Court to accept the restrictive view of 
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. According to petitioner, § 2254 
should be construed to require the dismissal of all mixed 
petitions. 
The briefs deal with this important issue in a way that I 
find disappointing. Since Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-420 
(1963), this Court's habeas cases have echoed three policy p~ 
concerns: (1) justice to the petitioner in the particular case-~
-thus the repeated references to "the Great Writ" as the sacred 
4. 
guarantor of individual liberty; (2) c~mity--the policy of 
according respect to the states and their judicial systems; and 
(3) judicial economy--the concern to avoid piecemeal litigation 
r -
and to achieve finality of criminal judgments. The briefs in 
this case tend merely to recite quotations endorsing the 
importance of one or another factor. They are weak, I think, 
~~ 
in their evaluations of the case at hand. That is, they do not 
make clear the extent to which the various policy interests are 
specifically implicated in cases involving both exhausted and 
unexhausted claims. 
Because of your active role in the development of this 
area of the law, I assume your familiarity with the general 
arguments. Where possible, I shall attempt to focus either on 
matters not raised in the briefs or on concerns peculiar to 
"mixed" petitions. 
A. The Statutory Background 
This case arises under § 2254 of the judicial code. 
Section 2254(b) provides that the writ of habeas corpus is not 
available "unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted 
the remedies available" in state court. The exhaustion ...._________. 
requirement is then defined in subsection (c): "An applicant 
~----.. 
shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in 
the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, 
11 
if he has the right under the law of the State to raise •.• the ,, 
question presented." 
As suggested by the language emphasized, the plain 
language of the statute appears to require the exhaustion of 
5. 
remedies regarding the question presented, not regarding all of 
the question.§_ that a petitioner might present. In Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), Justice Brennan argued in dissent 
that the jurisdictional language of § 2254 was both clear and 
mandatory. He argued that it was improper for a federal court 
to exercise less than the full jurisdiction conferred by 
Congress. Your majority opinion held otherwise. An argument 
similar to Justice Brennan's can be made in this case. It 
would once again be forceful. Again, however, the plain 
language of the statute--although important--would not seem 
-----------~-------
dis~itjye. Congress adopted the exhaustion requirement in ~ 
1948. The Reviser's notes state that its intent was to codify ~ 
the existing~ as articulated by the Supreme Court.~~ 
The Court at that time had never entertained a mixed petition,~~~ 
'--~ Z...~l..f 
nor tacitly approved the consideration of one by any lower ~ .J.o 
federal court. Moreover, 
were cognizable on habeas 
I~ ..-If. ~-I _. 
it is significant that few claims ~~ 
~~ 
in 1948. It is unlikely that~~. 
Congress contemplated the present problem. Nor can conclusions tlf~ 
be drawn from congressional reenactment. This Court has never~~ 
 
before addressed the question presented. It did rule on the ~
merits of a mixed petition in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 ~ 
~~ 
(197 2) . In doing so, it noted the existence of an unexhausted 4:... ~
claim. Id. at 519. In Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59~~ 
(1974), however, the Court expressly reserved the issue. The 
Court in that case found other grounds on which to overturn the 
dismissal of an exhausted claim because of its joinder with an 
unexhausted one. Id. at 63-64. 
f • 6. , 
It is also significant that the Court--before 1948 as 
well as after--had held consistently that the exhaustion 
requirement was judicially self-imposed. It was "not one 
defining power but one which relates to the appropriate 
exercise of that power." Bowen v. Johnson, 3 06 U.S. 19, 27 
(1938). This historical status may increase the Court's 
discretion to view § 2254 as delineating the minimum limits of 
the exhaustion doctrine, subject to further judicial 
adjustment. 
Two other sources of guidance also seem relevant to the 
question of congressional intent. Rule 9(b) of the Rules 
Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, 
28 u.s.c.A. foll. § 2254, establishes the standards under 
which the district courts may dismiss a second or successive 
petition asserting new grounds for relief. That rule 
effectively codifies the decision of Sanders v. United States, ~~ 
5 
373 u.s. 1, 18 (1963). Sanders held that the district courts ~f-
must entertain successive petitions unless that judge "finds~~ 
( ht A 
that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a ,g Z r ~ 
~
prior petition constituted abuse of the writ." (emphasis ~~ 
added). The Rules thus seem to contemplate cases in which a -~ 
l
petitioner will bring successive petitions in which he asserts 
d . ff d f . f ~ h. . 1 erent groun s or rel1e • T 1s 1s at least consistent with 
the view that a petitioner could assert only his exhausted 
claims in one petition; he could then, on a later petition, 
assert new grounds not exhausted at the time of the original 
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petitioner for the pleading error of including unexhausted ------claims in the original petition. 
In its brief, the State of Tennessee assumes that 
withdrawal of an unexhausted claim from a mixed petition "could 
very likely shut the federal haveas door altogether." Brief at 
24. But the rules do not seem to contemplate this harsh 
result. 
B. Factors to be Weighed 
A balancing test assumes implicitly that "The rule of 
exhaustion is not one defining power but one which relates to 
the appropriate exercise of power." There would seem to be 
three important factors. 
~-----------------
1. Interest of the Prisoner. At one level, the entire 
dispute can be seen as a disagreement about the importance 
properly to be attributed to this factor. The ultimate premise 
of Fay v. Noia is that no interest of the state can override 
the need for an immediate remedy for the violation of 
constitutional rights. Respondent asserts such an interest in 
this case. The State responds that its proposed exhaustion 
requirement would not bar any individual's access to habeas 
review: it would only regulate the timing. 
2. Comity Interests of the States. In a federal system 
it frequently occurs that state and federal courts must rule on 
the same question. Friction is therefore inevitable. But the 
states have distinct interests in avoiding federal review of 
criminal convictions until state courts have ruled on all 
asserted grounds of error. 
.• . . 
8. 
Extension of the exhaustion doctrine to mixed petitions 
would cause the prompt consideration of all federal claims in 
state court. This would arguably enhance the states' 
understanding of and hospitality toward federal claims. It 
would also enable state courts to declare controlling state 
precedents on matters of federal constitutional law. According 
to petitioner, decisions of the lower federal courts are not 
binding on Tennessee trial courts. See Bowman v. Henard, 547 
S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tenn. 1977). A rule requiring full exhaustion 
would insure consideration of all state constitutional claims. 
It would also let the state courts determine all relevant 
questions of fact, at a time when memories are fresh. In 
addition, complete exhaustion would require definitive rulings 
on the state's procedural laws, leaving no doubt whether a 
claim should be barred from habeas review due to procedural 
default. 
In assessing the state's interest in ruling on all claims 
prior to any federal action, it is important to note that 
seemingly unrelated claims may tend to merge in the process of 
judicial decision. The instant case provides an apt example. 
The district court purported not to rule on unexhausted claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct. 
consider them as a part of 
In fact, however, 
its deliberations. 
the court did 
It explained 
that "in assessing the atmosphere of the cause taken as a whole 
these items may be referred to collaterally." 
Respondent answers that the state's interest is adequately 
protected by dismissal of the unexhausted claims. State courts 
~ .. '·· •' 
9. 
have already ruled on the others: and there is no need to 
consider the unexhausted claims if there is merit in an 
exhausted claim. Petitioner imagines a class of shrewd prison 
lawyers who orchestrate their successive claims to take maximum 
advantage of the sys tern. But this is a phantom fear. The 
typical habeas petitioner acts in ignorance. 
3. Judicial Economy. A requirement of complete 
exhaustion would promote judicial efficiency. Unless complete 
exhaustion is required, "a federal district court may be forced 
to review a state criminal court record not once, but two, 
three or four times." Miller v. Missouri, 394 F.Supp. 94, 102 
(W .D. Mo. 197 5). 
Respondent attempts to minimize the significance of this 
consideration. First, only interrelated claims would 
ordinarily involve review of the same materials more than once. 
And most circuits seem to follow the Second in requiring the 
dismissal of interrelated claims in mixed petitions. Second, 
most petitioners will in fact consolidate their claims. 
A different slant on this problem comes from Professor 
S~o, who did an empirical study of the habeas petitions 
filed in the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts during a 
three-year period. See Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study 
in Massachusetts, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 321 (1973). Of the 257 
petitions filed, only 34 came from prisoners who had previously 
sought federal habeas. Of these, only five "could be said to 
have sought reconsideration of matters disposed of on the 
merits before, or matters that could have been (and should have 




. . . 10 • 
been) joined in the prior pleading." Id. at 354. The demands 
of successive petitioneers were thus relatively small. Perhaps 
more surprisingly, Professor Shapiro found that failure to 
exhaust state remedies resulted in dismissal of over half of 
all the petitions filed. From this he concluded that strict 
exhaustion requirements actually contributed to judicial J 
inefficiency, by requiring successive trips through the state 
and federal courts. He therefore proposed abolition of the 
exhaustion requirement, at least in cases where judicial 
inspection showed a claim to be plainly frivolous. 
In sum, Professor Shapiro's study suggests that the 
efficiency question requires a consideration of two classes of 
petitioners: the sadly inept as well as the the shrewd ----
"sandbaggers" who loom so large in the concern of the State of ...------__.... 
Tennessee. The rule that works best for one class may not work 
best for the other--even in terms of judicial efficiency. 
Moroever, even with regard to the sandbaggers, it is unclear 
that a toughened exhaustion rule would work effectively. 
As Judge Goldberg pointed out in dissenting from a Fifth 
Circuit case mandating dismissal of mixed petitions, "So long 
as a petitioner with both exhausted and unexhausted claims 
refrains from including the unexhausted claims in his petition, 
the petition cannot be dismissed ..•. His second petition, 
asserting only newly exhausted grounds, likewise cannot be 
dismissed ..•• A petitioner clever and sophisticated unough to 
understand and be influenced in his behavior by the majority's 
rule will also be clever and sophisticated enough to avoid its 
, .. '··· 
11. 
effect. The specter which haunts the majority opinion proves 
in the end too elusive to grasp. Meanwhile, the 
unsophisticated petitioner who appends to his federal petition 
some new notion not previously presented to the state courts, 
is denied a federal hearing on the merits of his exhausted 
claim." Galtieri v. Wainright, 582 F.2d 348, 374 (CA 5 1978) 
(en bane) (Goldberg, J., joined by Tuttle, J., dissenting). 
Judge Hill, concurring specially in Galtieri, also noted a 
problem deserving of attention: What to do in a case in which 
a district court does grant relief on a mixed petition? The 
Fifth Circuit determined it had little choice but to hear an 
appeal on the merits. It would be undesirable on various 
grounds to require a state court to hear unexhausted claims, 
knowing as it did that a federal court had ruled favorably on 
one of the exhausted grounds. The result, Judge Hill argued, 
was that "the majority does not promulgate a rule as we know it 
in law. It cannot be such a rule because the consequences 
[of a district court's failure or refusal to follow the 
"rule"]are not reversal but review on the merits I 
interpret the opinion of our Court as announcing a rule in the 
more colloquial use of that word; 'as a general rule' mixed 
petitions should be dismissed without prejudice.'" 582 F.2d at 
365. 
If this Court's decision should mandate dismissal of mixed 
petitions, the paradox propounded by Judge Hill ought somehow 
to be addressed. 





As the text of this discussion may have suggested, I do I 
believe that § 2254 should be held to require dismissal of 
mixed petitions in all cases. Your opinions in previous cases 
strongly suggest that you may well conclude otherwise. The 
decision in this case is obviously yours. I have felt free to 
develop the arguments with which I think you should reckon; but 
I surely do not regard them as intellectually irresistable. In 
R.. 
concluding this section, I woud beg your indulgence as I 
briefly develop my own view (which is much influenced by an 
_. ._........... 
excellent Note, Habeas Petitions with Exhausted and Unexhausted 
Claims: Speedy Release, Comity and Judicial Efficiency, 57 B.U. 
L. Rev. 864 (1977)): 
In general, the balance of policy considerations supports 
a literal construction of the statutory language. Exhaustion 
should be required only for "the question presented." This is 
sufficient to preserve the role of the state courts in 
enforcing federal law; federal courts would not grant relief on 
any claim that had not been raised in state proceedings. 
Moreover, for the reasons described above, no large efficiency 
loss would necessarily follow. 
As the Second Circuit has recognized, federal courts 
should surely refuse to consider individually exhausted claims 
in certain circumstances. Most notably, they should decline to 
consider exhausted claims that are interrelated--either legally 
or factually--with unexhausted claims. Tennessee claims in 
this case that there is no clear rule for identifying 
interrelated claims. But three fairly clear categories of 
\(. '·. 
13. 
cases actually do seem to have emerged in the lower federal 
courts: 1. those involving more than one claim of the same 
general constitutional right; 2. those in which two or more 
claims are based on the same allegations of fact; and 3. those 
that require an understanding of totality of the circumstances 
at trial (e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel). By 
refusing to rule on mixed petitions in such cases, federal 
courts can give state courts a fair opportunity to decide all 
aspects of each claim and to develop a full record. 
Federal courts should also dismiss mixed peitions in cases 
involving unexhausted state constitutional claims. This 
limitation follows from the pol icy against unnecessary 
decisions of constitutional questions. Finally, a federal 
court should generally refuse to rule on mixed petitions 
brought prior to trial. Pretrial habeas intervention is 
especially disruptive of state criminal proceedings. Cf. 
Braden v. Thirtieth Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) 
(federal habeas relief appropriate to protect a state 
prisoner's right to a speedy trial). 
? 
c 
In conclusion, I would note only that the proposed CA~ 
1/Z..LLV 
requirement of complete exhaustion is in one sense the more ~
extreme solution: It denies any discretion to the lower ~~ 
federal courts to determine when the totality of factors tips ~~c: 
in favor of action on a mixed petition. Lundy does not ask for 
----------~--~------------~---a rule mandating a ruling on every exhausted claim in every 
mixed petition. His position thus accords, not only with the 
14. 
judgment of the majority of the circuits, but with the 
traditional view of habeas as governed by equitable principles. 
II. THE SECOND QUESTION: "CAUSE AND PREJUDICE" BARRIER TO 
RELIEF 
In his federal habeas petition, Lundy alleged that two 
specific instance of prosecutorial misconduct had deprived him 
of a fair trial. These claims were numbered in his petition as 
grounds for relief (2) and (3). The district court found that 
ground (3), a remark made by the prosecutor during his 
summation, had not been exhausted. Although its opinion is 
arguably self-contradictory on this point, the district court 
does not appear to have considered this claim. 
The court's treatment of the second ground is puzzling. 
Lundy's habeas petition had generally alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct in violation of his constitutional rights. See JA 
72. The recitation of "supporting facts," however, had alleged 
only one specific instance of prosecutorial misconduct. It 
involved remarks made during an effort to introduce evidence of 
Lundy's "violent character." Ignoring this limitation, the 
district court read this claim as a general allegation of 
1 
.~ecutorial misconduct. On this basis it proceeded to 
p~consider 19 separate acts of misconduct, only five of which had 
~ been either objected to or subsequently presented to the state 
supreme court. 
The specific claim that Lundy asserted--based on remarks 
about his violent character--had been considered by the state 
/tf / 
15. 
appellate court. It stated: "State's counsel made some remarks 
in the presence of the jury that were overly zealous in support 
of this incompetent line of proof, and in a different case 
could constitute prejudicial error ••.• However, in the context 
of the undisputed facts of this case we hold any error to have 
been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 
386 u.s. 18." 
The first question for this Court is what question it 
es to address. The district court seems plainly to have 
issues not presented to it. In doing so, it 
ported to find legal errors concerning which it gave the 




petition raised those errors, various barriers might have been~ 
raised. These include the absence of exhaustion and the "caus: V'f 6G -~ 
and prejudice" rule concerning procedural defaults. The court~
of appeals seems vaguely to have been aware of the cause and ~ 4~ 
prejudice difficulty. But it purported to dismiss this concern 
by noting that the Tennessee appeals court had considered 
several of the defaulted claims on the merits. The Sixth 
Circuit did not, however, consider that those particular claims 
had not even been repeated in the federal habeas petition. 
Finally, with regard to the claim the petition clearly had 
presented, neither the district court nor the court of appeals 
reckoned at all with the Tennessee court's "harmless error" 
finding. 
~ JA.-.......~ 
As this summary suggests, the lower federal courts seem to 
" -have courted review--if not reversal--on a variety of grounds. 
' .. 
16. 
Most are invoked in one or another of the briefs. The cert 
petition framed its second question as follows: "Whether habeas 
corpus relief was properly granted to respondent on the grounds 
of prosecutorial misconduct and an improper jury instruction 
where those issues were waived by the respondent's failure to 
demonstrate cause and prejudice for his procedural defaults." 
Plainly, however, the claim regarding at least one instance of 
alleged misconduct had not been waived. The Solicitor General 
argues that the district court must be assumed to have credited 
the Tennessee court's "harmless error" finding concerning this 
point. Thus, he reasons, relief must have been based largely 
on claims--which he identifies in the district court's opinion 
and in the record-- that Lundy had not properly preserved. In 
his view, the question is whether collateral relief is barred 
for these claims unless the "cause and prejudice" standard is 
satisfied. 
At the outset, it seems clear that the district court's ,f)-t_ 
grant of relief on the basis of defaulted claims would be ~ 
II~ 
inconsistent with the "cause and prejudice" standard. Assuming cl-
the claims were not properly preserved in state cour~ 
proceedings, Lundy obviously did not show cause for his default 
'--- ~----~------------------------
or prejudice therefrom. He could not have, because he did not 
~ 
raise the claims at all in his habeas petition. 
In my view, however, the district court's finding of 
prosecutorial misconduct does not raise a clear and simple 
"cause and prejudice" question. The Tennessee court had itself 




characterized it as harmless. Lundy's claim for reversal of 
this finding was properly before the court and ripe for 
decision on the merits. Moreover, it was inextricably 
intertwined with the grant of relief based on claims not 
properly preserved. Thus, in its brief in this Court, the 
state of Tennessee now asserts that the question is whether 
habeas relief was proper "where the issues were either waived 
..• or were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as found by the 
state courts." As this suggests, there is a remaining 
question open for decision if the Court chooses to reach it. 
This question, which has been briefed by both parties, would 
~- - -- ~"' 
involve the credit due to the Tennessee court's harmless error
finding with regard to Lundy's claim (2). Was this finding of ~ ----
"harmless error," under § 2254 (d) and Sumner v. Mata, No. 79--
1601 (Jan.21, 1981), en~ tled to a pr~n of correctnes~?  
I believe that it was. Under 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d), "a ~ 
determination on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State 
court of competent jurisdiction ..• evidenced by a written 
finding 0 0 0 shall be presumed to be correct." Sumner held 
~----------------------squarely that this provision extends to factual findings by 
state appellate courts (as well as trial courts). Id., slip op 
at 6. The only remaining question, then, is whether a finding 
of harmless error is a "factual" finding within the 
contemplation of§ 2254(d). 
The State of Tennessee asserts summarily that it was. But 
several federal district courts have held that "harmless error" 
findings require independent federal review. See, e.g. , 
•'. 
18. 
Application of Stecker, 271 F.Supp. 406, aff'd, 381 F.2d 379 
(CA3), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 929 (1967). The implicit 
judgment is that this is a mixed question of law and fact, to 
which§ 2254(d) does not apply. 
Decisions of this Court are not especially helpful. The 
relevant line begins with Tonwse.nd v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 
(1963), the precursor of §2254. Townsend stated that the 
phrase "issues of fact" refers "to what are termed basic, 
primary, or historical facts: facts 'in the sense of a recital 
of external events and the credibility of their narrators.'" 
v 
372 U.S. at 309, n.6. Applying this formula, Neil v. Biggers, 
409 u.s. 188 (1972) reversed a Sixth Circuit decision holding 
that pretrial identification procedures were fair under a 
"totality of the circumstances test." Over Justice Brennan's 
protest that the Court should not reverse a finding of fact, 
id. at 202 (Brennan, J. , dissenting) , the opinion termed the 
issue before it ""Not so much over the elemental facts as over ~~~ 
the constitutional significance to be attached to them." Id. 
/ 
at 193 n.3. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 u.s. 387 (1977), the 
Court held that the question of waiver was not factual within 
the meaning of §2254(d). It was one that requires "the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found." Id. at 403. Your opinion in ~yler v. Sullivan, 446 
U.S. 335 (1980) held that "Findings about the roles of [two 
lawyers] in the defenses • • • are [historical findings binding 
on the court]. But the holding that the lawyers who played 
those roles did not engage in multiple representation is a 
19. 
mixed determination of law and fact that requires the 
application of legal principles to the facts of this case." 
v 
Id. at 342. Most recently, the Court held last Term in Sumner 
v. Mata, supra, that §2254(d) did bar an unexplained holding by 
the Ninth Circuit that a photographic identification procedure 
was "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable in-court 
misidentification." The opinion did not make clear, however, 
which of the the state court's underlying findings it found 
specifically entitled to deference and which it did not. 
The "harmless error" question seems to me to be a question 
----------------------------
of fact: a question of what the jury would have done if certain 
~ 
events had or had not occurred. Accordingly, I would hold that 
the district court erred in failing to give deference to the 
------------~ -------------------------------------finding of the Tennessee court of criminal appeals. But I 
think that this is a relatively close question. It is 
significant, I think, that there are some constitutional errors 
that cannot be "harmless" as a matter of law. In this context, 
it is possible to regard "harmlessness"--or its conceptual 
opposite, which is "prejudice"--as a finding (necessarily 
erroneous) of law. On the whole, however, 
reasonable to regard this as the 
I think it more I 
special, limiting case. 
Whether something would prejudice a jury is a question of fact. 
III. RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
Lundy's counsel attempted to impeach the rape victim 
through evidence of prior contradictory statements. He sought 
20. 
to prove that her testimony concerning prior acts of unchastity 
did not fully reveal the extent of her sexual activity. The 
district court limited this line on a theory found erroneous by 
the Tennessee court of criminal appeals. That court found the 
error to be harmless. Its finding in this regard was not 
considered either by the district court or by the court of 
appeals. 
The cert petition presents the question whether Lundy's 
constitutional right of confrontation was in fact abridged. I 
think, however, that this question should not be reached. The 
excluded testimony aimed at impeachment on a collateral rather 
than a central matter. Moreover, the viet im' s testimony was 
corroborated in nearly all respects by an eyewitness. As found 
by the Tennessee court, any error was therefore harmless. 
1 
If the Court does reach the constitutional question on the 
merits, it should hold that the right of confrontation was not 
in fact offended. -----___.-? The district court appears to have relied on 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) for its conclusion. But 
the testimony here involved a collateral matter of doubtful 
importance. Davis, by contrast, dealt with a crucial witness's ~ 
powerful motive to testify falsely against the accused. The 
weakness of the Sixth Amendment claim is suggested by 
subsequent legislative history. Tennessee has now adopted a 
law excluding evidence of the past sexual activity of rape 
victims. This law would exclude the very testimony Lundy 
wished to introduce. The Sixth Amendment challenge, if upheld 
21. 
in this case, would have implications for the constitutionality 
of this and similar laws. 
IV. RIGHT TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
The district court appears not to have consulted the 
entire trial record before its decision to grant habeas relief. 
Yet its grounds for decision plainly seem to require review of 
the entire transcript. Without a transcript, it could not 
properly determine whether the alleged constitutional 
violations were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
Tennessee appellate court had found that they were. Especially 
in this context, the act ion of the district court seems a 
~ ----------------
needless affront to the state and its courts. 
The State, however, did not file the entire transcript in 
its answer to Lundy's habeas petition. Nor did it move for an 
evidentiary hearing, or ask the district court for 
reconsideration. It sought a hearing for the first time in the 
court of appeals, where it asked for a remand. As a result, 
concerns of comity are intertwined with complex considerations 
of waiver and procedural default. 
Both parties have treated this as a minor issue in the 
case. In my view, this question is too complicated and 
important for summary treatment. I would advise that the Court 
not reach the issue, as it need not if it should decide to 
reverse on any other ground. 
" . <I • 
22. 
SUMMARY 
1. The main question in the case is whether 28 u.s.c. § 
~ 
2254 requires exhaustion of all state claims before a federal 
court may entertain~ of the claims on habeas. The statute 
requires exhaustion of "the question presented,"_not of all 
questions that might be presented. But the legislative history 
suggests that Congress may not have contemplated "successive" 
habeas petitions, much less meant to license them. The policy 
considerations point in different directions. The Court could 
responsibly decide either way. 
2. The District Court considered claims that were not 
properly presented in Lundy's petition. This was clearly 
incompatible with the "cause and prejudice" test. Not having 
presented the claims, Lundy plainly could not have shown cause 
for his failure to do so, or resulting prejudice at trial. 
3. The District Court also considered, without deference, 
errors held "harmless" by the Tennessee courts. This was error. 
A finding of "harmless error" is ordinarily a finding of fact. 
Such a finding is therefore entitled to deference from a federal 
court under Sumner v. Mata. 
4. There was no violation of the right to confrontation in 
this case. The reliance on Davis v. Alaska was misplaced. 
5. The question of the State's right to an evidentiary 
hearing need not and should not be reached on the facts of this 
~~··, 
·. 
case. The question is too important to be considered as a 






October 6, 1981 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Reply Brief in No. 80-846, Rose v. Lundy 
Petitioners have filed a reply brief. I call it to your 
attention because it presents what I regard as the State's best 
arguments with admirable force and succinctness, somewhat as 
{ {,7 -~ ~A~ L-o .i ~ ~ ~ .i ~ LJ' ) follows: Y ~ /_...,.--_.......,--
Federal habeas jurisdiction over state convictions exists 
29g insofar as granted by Congress. Fitts v. McGhee, 172 u.s. 
516 (1899). This basic doctrine was brushed aside in ~ v. 
Noia, 372 u.s. 391 (1963), which suggested that this Court's 
habeas power derived from the inherent nature of the writ. 
this was error. See id. (Harlan, J. , dissenting). 
After the codification of the exhaustion requirement in 
But 
1948, the habeas jurisdiction of federal courts was limited to 
e2Shaus~ .c~. Although the statute requires exhaustion only 
regarding "the question presented," the Court had previously not 
entertained mixed petitions, and Congress intended not to expand ...... ....,.. ,.... = 
but to define the limits on the then-existing jurisdiction. 
- - -- - I 
The requirement of complete exhaustion accords with 
consistent federal policy, which Congress must have intended to 
further. 
Toleration of mixed petitions produces an att i tude that 
criminal convictions are never final and thus undermines both the 
~ =-:,.... ,....-. ...... ,..,.__,.. 
educational and deterrent functions of the criminal law. See 
Bator, Finality and Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963). 
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80-846 Rose v. Lundy. 
The principal decision relied upon by petitioner 
is Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 349 (1978}, an en bane 
decision of CAS in which a majority laid down a flat rule 
~ 
that a federal district court ~ dismiss, without 
prejudice, a "mixed" petition for habeas corpus filed by a 
state prisoner which contains both exhausted and unexhausted 
claims. 
I do not believe another Circuit Court has gone 
quite this far. At least this is what Judge Roney, who 
wrote the leading dissenting opinion said. 
As I understand the dissent's position, it adopts 
what it calls a "flexible rule": 
"I sould leave it to the sound discretion of 
the District Judge to decide whether the 
efficiency of his office or the ends of 
justice are better served by considering 
exhausted claims asserted in a petition that 
also contains unexhausted claims. Subject ot 
review only for abuse of discretion, the 
District Court is, of course, at liberty to 
dismiss for failure to exhaust all claims." 
(at p. 376}. 
Under the dissent's flexible rule, if the District Court 
considers exhausted claims on a mixed petition, and there is 
review by the Court of Appeals, it must "review any grant of 
habeas corpus relief on the merits" whether there also are 
unexhausted issues. 
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~he princiPal ~ecision rPlie~ upon by Petitioner 
is Galtieri v. ~ainwriqht, 582 F.2d 34Q (1Q78), an en bane 
decision of ~A~ in which a majority laid down a flat rule 
that a federal district court mut dismiss, without 
preiudice, a "mixP~" petition for habeas corpus filed by a 
state prisoner which contains both exhausteo and unexhausted 
claims. 
I do not believe another ~ircuit Court has gone 
quite this far. At least this is what ,Judge Roney, who 
wrote the 1ea~ing dissentinq opinion said. 
As I understand the dissent's position, it adopts 
what it calls a "flexible rule": 
"I sould leave it to the sound discretion of 
th~ nistrict Judge to decide whether the 
efficiency of his office or the ends of 
justice are better served by considering 
exhausted claims asserted in a petition that 
also contains unexhausted claims. qubj~ct ot 
review only for abuse of discretion, the 
District Court is, of course, at liberty to 
dismiss for failure to exhaust all claims." 
(at p. 37fi). 
Under the dissent's flexible rule, if the District Court 
considers exhausted claims on a mixed petition, and there is 
review hy the Court of Appeals, it must "review any grant of 
habeas corpus relief on the merits" whether there also are 
unexhausted issues. 
PowELL, J., concurring 412 U.S. 
claim, the strength of the argument depending upon 
the nature of the claim, the manner of its treat-
ment (if any) in the conviction proceedings, and 
the circumstances under which collateral litigation 
must be had." 16 
No effective judicial system can afford to concede the 
continuing theoretical possibility that there is error in 
~ every trial and that every incarceration is unfounded. At 
some point the law must convey to those in custody that a 
wrong has been committed, that consequent punishment 
has been imposed, that one should no longer look back 
with the view to resurrecting every imaginable basis for 
further litigation but rather should look forward to re-
habilitation and to becoming a constructive citizen.17 
Nowhere should the merit of this view be more self-
evident than in collateral attack on an allegedly unlawful 
search and seizure, where the petitioner often asks society 
to redetermine a claim with no relationship at all to the 
justness of his confinement. Professor Amsterdam has 
noted that "for reasons which are common to all search 
and seizure claims," he "would hold even a slight finality 
interest sufficient to deny the collateral remedy." 18 But, 
in fact, a strong finality interest militates against allow-
16 Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 
112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378, 383-384 (1964). The article addresses the 
problem of collateral relief for federal prisoners, but its rationale 
applies forcefully to federal habeas for state prisoners as well. 
17 Mr. Justice Harlan put it very well: 
"Both the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest 
in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes 
with an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be. focused 
not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on 
whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the com-
munity." Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 24-25 (1963) 
(dissenting opinion). 
18 Supra, n. 16, at 388. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-846 
JIM ROSE, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. NOAH 
HARRISON LUNDY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1981] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case we consider whether the exhaustion rule in 28 
U. S. C. § 2254 (b)-(c) requires a federal district court to dis-
miss a petition for a writ of habeas corpus containing any 
claims that have not been exhausted in the state courts. Be-
cause a rule requiring exhaustion of all claims would further 
the purposes underlying the habeas statute, we hold that a 
district court must dismiss such "mixed petitions," leaving 
the prisoner with the choice of returning to state court to ex-
haust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the habeas 
petition to present only exhausted claims to the district 
court. 
I 
Following a jury trial, respondent Noah Lundy was con-
victed on charges of rape and crime against nature, and sen-
tenced to the Tennessee State Penitentiary. 1 Mter the 
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convic-
tions and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review, the 
respondent filed an unsuccessful petition for post-conviction 
relief in the Knox County Criminal Court. 
'The court sentenced the respondent to consecutive terms of 120 years 
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The respondent subsequently filed a petition in federal Dis-
trict Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2254, alleging four grounds for relief: (1) that he had been 
denied the right to confrontation because the trial court lim-
ited the defense counsel's questioning of the victim; (2) that 
he had been denied the right to a fair trial because the pros-
ecuting attorney stated that the respondent had a violent 
character; (3) that he had been denied the right to a fair trial 
because the prosecutor improperly remarked in his closing 
argument that the State's evidence was. uncontradicted; and 
(4) that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury that 
every witness is presumed to swear the truth. After re-
viewing the state court records, however, the District Court 
concluded that it could not consider claims three and four "in 
the constitutional framework" because the respondent had 
not exhausted his state remedies for those grounds. The 
court nevertheless stated that "in assessing the atmosphere 
of the cause taken as a whole these items may be referred to 
collaterally." 2 
Apparently in an effort to assess the "atmosphere" of the 
trial, the District Court reviewed the state trial transcript 
and identified 10 instances of prosecutorial misconduct, only 
five of which the respondent had raised before the state 
courts. 3 In addition, although purportedly not ruling on the 
2 The Tennessee Criminal Court of Appeals had ruled specifically on 
grounds one and two, holding that although the trial court erred in restrict-
ing cross examination of the victim and the prosecuting attorney improp-
erly alluded to the respondent's violent nature, the respondent was not 
prejudiced by these errors. Lundy v. State, 521 S.W. 2d 591, 595-596 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1974). 
3 In particular, the District Court found that the prosecutor improperly: 
(1) misrepresented that the defense attorney was guilty of illegal and 
unethical misconduct in interviewing the victim before trial. 
(2) "testified" that the victim was telling the truth on the stand. 
(3) stated his view of the proper method for the defense attorney to in-
terview the victim. 
0$0846J, 11/22/81, rev. Wilma 
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respondent's fourth ground for relief-that the state trial 
judge improperly charged that "every witness is presumed to 
swear the truth"-the court nonetheless held that the jury 
instruction, coupled with both the restriction of counsel's 
cross examination of the victim and the prosecutor's "per-
sonal testimony" on the weight of the State's evidence, see n. 
3, supra, violated the respondent's right to fair trial. In con-
clusion, the District Court stated: 
Also, subject to the question of exhaustion of state reme-
dies, where there is added to the trial atmosphere the 
comment of the Attorney General that the only story 
presented to the jury was by the state's witnesses there 
is such mixture of violations that one cannot be sepa-
rated from and considered independently of the others. 
Under the charge as given, the limitation of cross exami-
nation of the victim, and the flagrant prosecutorial mis-
conduct this court is compelled to find that petitioner did 
(4) misrepresented the law regarding interviewing government 
witnesses. 
(5) misrepresented that the victim had a right for both private counsel 
and the prosecutor to be present when interviewed by the defense counsel. 
(6) represented that because an attorney. was not present, the defense 
counsel's conduct was inexcusable. 
(7) represented that he could validly file a grievance with the Bar Asso-
ciation on the basis of the defense counsel's conduct. 
(8) objected to defense counsel's cross examination of the victim. 
(9) commented that the defendant had a violent nature. 
(10) gave his personal evaluation of the State's proof. 
The petitioner concedes that the state appellate court considered in-
stances 1, 3, 4, 5, and 9, but states without contradiction that the defend-
ant did not object to the prosecutor's statement that the victim was telling 
the truth (#2) or to any of the several instances where the prosecutor, in 
summation, gave his opinion on the weight of the evidence (#10). The pe-
titioner also notes that the conduct identified in #6 and #7 did not occur in 
front of the jury, and that the conduct in #8, which was only an objection to 
cross examination, can hardly be labelled as misconduct. 
0$0846J, 11/22/81, rev. Wilma 
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not receive a fair trial, his Sixth Amendment rights were 
violated and the jury poisoned by the prosecutorial 
misconduct. 4 
In short, the District Court considered several instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct never challenged in the state trial 
or appellate courts, or even raised in the respondent's habeas 
petition. 
In an unreported order, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
judgment of the District Court, concluding that the court 
properly found that the respondent's constitutional rights 
had been "seriously impaired by the improper limitation of 
his counsel's cross-examination of the prosecutrix and by the 
prosecutorial misconduct." The court specifically rejected 
the State's argument that the District Court should have dis-
missed the petition because it included both exhausted and 
unexhausted claims. 
II 
The petitioner urges this Court to adopt a "total exhaus-
tion" rule requiring district courts to dismiss every habeas 
corpus petition that contains both exhausted and unex-
hausted claims. 5 The petitioner argues at length that such a 
4 The court granted the writ and ordered the respondent discharged 
from custody unless within 90 days the State initiated steps to bring a new 
trial. 
5 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have adopted a "total exhaustion" rule. 
See Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F. 2d 348, 355--360 (CA5 1978) (en bane), 
and Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F. 2d 807, 808--810 (CA9 1976). A majority of 
the courts of appeals, however, have permitted the district courts to re-
view the exhausted claims in a mixed petition. See, e. g., Katz v. King, 
627 F. 2d 568, 574 (CAl 1980); Cameron v. Fastoff, 543 F. 2d 971, 976 
(CA2 1976); United States ex rel. Tratino v. Hatrack, 563 F. 2d 86, 91-95 
(CA3 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 928 (1978); Hewett v. North Carolina, 
415 F. 2d 1316, 1320 (CA4 1969); Meeks v. Jago, 548 F. 2d 134, 137 (CA6 
1976), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 844 (1977); Brown v. Wisconsin State Dep't of 
Public Welfare, 457 F. 2d 257, 259 (CA7), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 862 
(1972); Tyler v. Swenson, 483 F. 2d 611, 614 (CA8 1973); Whiteley v. 
0$0846.1, 11/22/81, rev. Wilma 
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rule would further the policy of comity underlying the ex-
haustion doctrine because it would give the state courts the 
first opportunity to correct federal constitutional errors and 
would minimize federal interference and disruption of state 
judicial proceedings. The petitioner also believes that a 
total exhaustion rule would reduce the amount of piecemeal 
habeas litigation. 
Under the petitioner's scheme, a district court would dis-
miss a petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted 
claims, giving the prisoner the choice of returning to state 
court to litigate his unexhausted claims, or of proceeding 
with only his exhausted claims in federal court. The peti-
tioner believes that a prisoner would be reluctant to choose 
the latter route since a district court could, under Habeas 
Corpus Rule 9(b), 28 U.S. C. §2254, dismiss subsequent 
federal habeas petitions as an abuse of the writ. 6 In other 
words, if the petitioner amended the petition to delete the 
unexhausted claims or immediately refiled in federal court a 
petition alleging only his exhausted claims, he could lose the 
opportunity to litigate his presently unexhausted claims in 
federal court. 
Meacham, 416 F. 2d 36, 39 (CAlO 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 401 U. S. 
560 (1971). 
In Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972), this Court reviewed the 
merits of an exhausted claim after expressly acknowledging that the pris-
oner had not exhausted his state remedies for all of the claims presented in 
his habeas petition. Gooding does not control the present case, however, 
since the question of total exhaustion was not before the Court. Two 
years later, in Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U. S. 59, 63--&i (1974) (per 
curiam), the Court expressly reserved the question of whether § 2254 re-
quires total exhaustion of claims. 
6 Rule 9 (b) provides that: 
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it 
fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determina-
tion was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the 
judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a 
prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ. 
0$0846J, 11/22/81, rev. Wilma 
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In order to evaluate the merits of the petitioner's argu-
ments, we turn to the habeas statute, its legislative history, 
and the policies underlying the exhaustion doctrine. 
III 
A 
The exhaustion doctrine existed long before its codification 
by Congress in 1948. In Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 251 
(1886), this Court wrote that as a matter of comity, federal 
courts should not consider a claim in a habeas corpus petition 
until after the state courts have had an opportunity to act: 
The injunction to hear the case summarily, and there-
upon "to dispose of the party as law and justice require" 
does not deprive the court of discretion as to the time 
and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred 
upon it. That discretion should be exercised in the light 
of the relations existing, under our system of govern-
ment, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of 
the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public 
good requires that those relations be not disturbed by 
unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to 
guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution. 
Subsequent cases refined the principle that state remedies 
must be exhausted except in unusual circumstances. See, 
e. g., United States, ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U. S. 13, 
17-19 (1925) (holding that the lower court should have dis-
missed the petition because none of the questions had been 
raised in the state courts. "In the regular and ordinary 
course of procedure, the power of the highest state court in 
respect of such questions should first be exhausted."). In 
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 117 (1944), this Court reit-
erated that comity was the basis for the exhaustion doctrine: 
"it is a principle controlling all habeas corpus petitions to the 
federal courts, that those courts will interfere with the ad-
0$0846J, 11/22/81, rev. Wilma 
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ministration of justice in the state courts only 'in rare cases 
where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are 
shown to exist."' 7 None of these cases, however, specifi-
cally applied the exhaustion doctrine to habeas petitions con-
taining both exhausted and unexhausted claims. 
In 1948, Congress codified the exhaustion doctrine in 28 
U. S. C. § 2254, citing Ex parte Hawk as correctly stating 
the principle of exhaustion. 8 Section 2254, 9 however, does 
not directly address the problem of mixed petitions. To be 
sure, the provision states that a remedy is not exhausted if 
there exists a state procedure to raise "the question pre-
sented," but we believe this phrase to be too ambiguous to 
sustain the conclusion that Congress intended to either per-
mit or prohibit review of mixed petitions. Because the legis-
7 The Court also made clear, however, that the exhaustion doctrine does 
not bar relief where the state remedies are inadequate or fail to "afford a 
full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions raised." Ex parte 
Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 118 (1944). 
8 The Reviser's Notes in the appendix of the House Report stated that: 
"This new section [§ 2254] is declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the 
Supreme Court. (See Ex parte Hawk, 1944, 64 S. Ct. 448, 321 U. S. 114, 
88 L. Ed. 572.)." H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A180 (1947). 
See also Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 210 (1950) ("In § 2254 of the 1948 
recodification of the Judicial Code, Congress gave legislative recognition to 
the Hawk rule for the exhaustion of remedies in the state courts and this 
Court."); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 447-450 (1953); Fay v. Noia, 372 
u. s. 391, 434 (1963). 
9 Section 2254 in part provides: 
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted un-
less it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in 
the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State 
corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such pro-
cess ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. 
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies 
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he 
has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available proce-
dure, the question presented. 
0$0846J, 11122/81, rev. Wilma 
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lative history of§ 2254, as well as the pre-1948 cases, contains 
no reference to the problem of mixed petitions, 10 in all likeli-
hood Congress never thought of the problem. 11 Conse-
quently, we must analyze the policies underlying the statu-
tory provision to determine its proper scope. 
B 
The exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect 
the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and 
prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings. See 
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 
U. S. 484, 490-491 (1973). 12 Under our federal system, the 
10 Section 2254 was one small part of a comprehensive revision of the J u-
dicial Code. The original version of§ 2254, as passed by the House, pro-
vided that: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court or authority of a State officer 
shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the 
remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is no adequate 
remedy available in such courts or that such courts have denied him a fair 
adjudication of the legality of his detention under the Constitution and laws 
of the United States. 
The Senate amended the House bill, changing the House version of § 2254 
to its present form. The Senate Report accompanying the bill states that 
one purpose of the amendment was "to substitute detailed and specific lan-
guage for the phrase 'no adequate remedy available.' That phrase is not 
sufficiently specific and precise, and its meaning should, therefore, be 
spelled out in more detail in the section as is done by the amendment." S. 
Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1948). The House accepted the 
Senate version of the Judicial Code without further amendment. 
In 1966, Congress amended the § 2254 to add subsection (a) and redes-
ignate the existing paragraphs as subsections (b) and (c). See Pub. L. No. 
89-711, § 2 (c), 80 Stat. 1105. 
11 See Note, Habeas Petitions with Exhausted and Unexhausted Claims: 
Speedy Release, Comity and Judicial Efficiency, 57 B. U.L. Rev. 864, 867 
n. 30 (1977) (suggesting that before 1948 habeas petitions did not contain 
multiple claims). 
'
2 See also Developments, Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 
1038, 1094 (1970) (cited favorably in Braden). 
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federal and state "courts [are] equally bound to guard and 
protect rights secured by the Constitution." Ex parte Roy-
all, supra, at 251. Because "it would be unseemly in our 
dual system of government for a federal district court to up-
set a state court conviction without an opportunity to the 
state courts to correct a constitutional violation," federal 
courts apply the doctrine of comity, which "teaches that one 
court should defer action on causes properly within its juris-
diction until the courts of another sovereignty with concur-
rent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had 
an opportunity to pass upon the matter." Darr v. Burford, 
339 U. S. 200, 204 (1950). See Duckworth v. Serrano,--
U. S. -- (1981) (per curiam) (noting that the exhaustion re-
quirement "serves to minimize friction between our federal 
and state systems of justice by allowing the State an initial 
opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of 
prisoners' federal rights"). 
A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage 
state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, 
thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all 
claims of constitutional error. As the number of prisoners 
who exhaust all of their federal claims increases, state courts 
may become increasingly familiar with and hospitable toward 
federal constitutional issues. See Braden v. 30th Judicial 
Circuit Court of Kentucky, supra, at 490. Equally as impor-
tant, fully exhausted federal claims will more often be ac-
companied by a complete factual record to aid the federal 
courts in their review. Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (d) (requiring a 
federal court reviewing a habeas petition to presume as cor-
rect factual findings made by a state court). 
The facts of the present case underscore the need for a rule 
7 encouraging exhaustion of all federal claims. In his opinion, 
the district court judge wrote that "there is such mixture of 
violations that one cannot be separated from and considered 
independently of the others." Because the two unexhausted 
claims for relief were intertwined with the exhausted ones, 
0$0846J, 11122/81, rev. Wilma 
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the judge apparently considered all of the claims in ruling on 
the petition. 13 Requiring dismissal of petitions containing 
both exhausted and unexhausted claims will relieve the dis-
trict courts of the difficult if not impossible task of deciding 
when claims are related, and will reduce the temptation to 
consider unexhausted claims. 
The prisoner's principal interest, of course, is in obtaining 
speedy federal relief on his claims. See Braden v. 30th Judi-
cial Circuit Court of Kentucky, supra, at 490. ~total ex-
~e will not impair that interest since he can ~ays 
amend the petition to d~le_t,e the unexhausted claiJ'!!S, rather 
t~ng to state court to exhaust all orliis claims. By 
invoking this procedure, however, the prisoner would risk 
forfeiting consideration of his unexhausted claims in federal 
court. Under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 Rule 9 (b), a district court 
may dismisss subsequent petitions if it finds that "the failure 
of the petitioner to assert those [new] grounds in a prior peti-
tion constituted an abuse of the writ." See n. 6, supra. The 
Advisory Committee to the Rules notes that Rule 9 (b) incor-
porates the judge-made principle governing the abuse of the 
writ set forth in Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 18 
(1963), where this Court stated that "if a prisoner deliber-
ately withholds one of two grounds for federal collateral relief 
at the time of filing his first application . . . he may be 
deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on a second 
application presenting the withheld ground. . . . Nothing in 
the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to 
tolerate needless piecemeal litigation." See Advisory Com-
mittee Note to Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b), 28 U. S. C., p. 273. 
Thus a prisoner who decides to proceed only with his ex-
18 Unquestionably, the District Court erred to the extent it considered 
unexhausted claims in granting habeas relief. Rather than simply re-
manding the case for consideration of the exhausted claims alone, we reach 
the issue of whether the District Court should have entertained the mixed 
petition at all. 
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hausted claims and deliberately sets aside his unexhausted 
claims risks dismissal of subsequent federal petitions. 
___.llt sum, because a total exhaustion rule promotes comity 
~and.l\not unreasonably impair the prisoner's right tore-
lief, we hold that a district court must dismiss habeas peti-
tions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims. 14 
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed 
and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
14 Because of our disposition of this case, we do not reach the petitioner's 
claims that the grounds offered by the respondent do not merit habeas 
relief. 
Jv-t ~St!Jc ~ 
~ Q_ ~J-td-Y 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
November 23, 1981 ~ ~ 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Rose v. Lundy, No. 80-846 
Justice O'Connor has today circulated an opinion in this 
case. I think it handles the issue in a reasonable and 
acceptable way, and I recommend that you join it. 
+'-'~c: t:-
I call ~ points to your attention. 
(1) As I read the opinion, it is deliberately ambiguous 
about whether "complete exhaustion" is required by the 
jurisdictional command of Congress or represents an exercise of 
judicial self-restraint in the face of the uncertain legislative 
intent of § 2254. I think this is the only honest approach. But 
it does result in a "weaker" opinion than would a clear holding 
that the exhuastion rule is congressionally mandated. (On the 
other hand, it avoids an implicitly unqualified admission that 
the Court acted without jurisdiction when it decided Gooding v. 
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) .) 
(2) The opinion very neatly handles a point raised 
implicitly by Justice Stevens's questions from the bench--the 
question what a federal judge should do when the only meritorious 
claims have been exhausted, but a petition includes unexhausted 
frivolous claims. The opinion makes it possible to invite 
•• ..a ... 
amendment to remove the frivolous claims from the petition. It 
makes clear the consequence: a possible bar to subsequent 
litigation of the claims excluded from the amended petition. 
But, by hypothesis, they were frivolous anyway. No injustice 
therefore results. 
(3) The part of the opinion discussed in (2), supra, 
provides an implicit answer to the strongest arguments of the 
defendant/respondent--i.e., that the federal courts should act 
quickly on arguably meritorious petitions in order to avoid the 
injustice of wrongful imprisonment. I think this is probably 
sufficient, though I would have been slightly happier if the 
opinion confronted more directly the arguments on the other side. 
Section II begins "The petitioner urges this Court .••• ," and the 
remainder of the opinion discusses the case from the petitioner's 
perspective. The views of the respondent are never met "head-
on." 
On balance, though, I think 
again--! think you should join. 
which--
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKtv1UN 
Re : 
Dear Sandra : 
-.:§ttp'ttltU' <Q'omf ttf tip· 'Jlltt:iUb ~faits 
~ 1:1:$ frin.gLm. ~ . <!J. 211 gt )!,~ 
No . 80-84 6 - Rose v. Lundy 
Novembe r 24, 19 81 
As you wil l have surmised , I shal l be wr i ting a 
dissent in this case in due course . 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Conno r 
cc : The Conference 
··' 
November 24, 1981 
R0-846 Rose v. Lundv 
Dear Sandra: 
Plea!=;e join me. 
Justice O'Connor 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
~nvunu <!fttnrl11"f Ur~ 'Jliniult ~tat~.s­
.. ag!rington. ~. <!J. 211gi'l~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
November 24, 1981 
Re: No. 80-846, Rose v. Lundy 
Dear Sandra: 
As I suggested at conference, I am persuaded that 
the position taken in your opinion will increase rather 
than lessen the burdens on both state and federal 
judges. Accordingly, I will not be able to join your 
opinion. Since I anticipate that Harry will be writing 
in dissent -- he was the only vote to affirm -- I will 
await his reaction and then probably add a short 
statement of my reasons for believing the case was 











;§u:pr.rmr <!Jcu.rt cf t4t 1JUtitrb ;§ta.Us-
'l11aslyingtcn. ~. <!J. 20gYJ.l.~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL November 24, 1981 
Re: No. 80-846 - Rose v. Lundy 
Dear Sandra: 





cc: The Conference 
1,.. ,' ..,· 
C H AMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.;§upumt <!Jomi of tlft 2lfuittb .;§tldts 
~asfrington. t:B. <!J. 20~)!.~ 
November 25, 1981 
Re: No. 80-846 Rose v. Lundy 
Dear Sandra: 
I am sure you realize by the Conference discussion and 
the letter which Bill Brennan has sent you today that you 
are "in the middle" where you will probably find yourself on 
more than one occasion. I was somewhat di sappointed that 
your opinion did not place any more stringent requirements 
on the availability of habeas corpus to state prisoners than 
it did, but am willing to go along with it as it now stands. 
If it were to be changed to meet Bill Brennan's criticism, I 





Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.§upnmt (!Jourl of Urf ~t.dt ;§taitg 
~aslyinglon. ~· cq. 20giJ!;l 
November 25, 1981 
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CHAM BERS OF 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
Dear Sandra, 
.:§npumt t!fcurl of flrt 'Jllufub .:§hm~ 
~&Pltittgtttt4 gl. <!}. 20gi'l.~ 
November 25, 1981 
No. 80-846 -- Rose v. Lundy. 
Your circulation of November 23 presents prob-
lems for me, because it reaches questions that are not 
before us and that in my view we should not address. My 
difficulties focus upon your discussion, on pages 10-11, 
of the "abuse of the writ" dismissal procedure outlined 
in Rule 9(b). I think that it is unnecessary to reach 
this issue here, and in any event I cannot agree with 
your analysis. 
As you recognize on page 10, Rule 9(b) adopts 
the "abuse of the writ" standard announced in Sanders v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). A correct construction 
of the Rule thus depends upon a proper intepretation of 
Sanders. In my view, your interpretation of the Sanders 
standard makes the dismissal of successive petitions far 
too easy. You quote from Sanders, id., at 18, for the 
premise that "if a prisoner deliberately withholds one of 
two grounds for federal collateral relief at the time of 
filing his first application, ... he may be deemed to 
have waived his right to a hearing on a second applica-
tion presenting the withheld ground ••.• Nothing in the 
traditions of habeas corpus require the federal courts to 
tolerate needless piecemeal litigation." From this you 
conclude, "Thus a prisoner who decides to proceed only 
with his exhausted claims and deliberately sets aside his 
unexhausted claims risks dismissal of subsequent federal 
petitions." Pages 10-11. 
I have difficulties both with the premise and 
with the conclusion. As to the premise, isn't your quo-
tation from Sanders incomplete, in that it omits language 
'1 
·.··.·.~· ;, ;~:· .. ';. :;{ 
,.... . ., ... 
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critically important to a proper interpretation of the 
Sanders standard? Where you placed your first ellipsis, 
didn't Sanders make it plain that its concern was with "a 
prisoner deliberately withhold[ing] one of two grounds" 
for relief "in the hope of being granted two hearings 
rather than one or for some other such reason"? Where 
you placed your second ellipsis, didn't Sanders note that 
waiver might also be inferred where "the prisoner delib-
erately abandons one of his grounds at the first 
hearing"? And immediately after the language you quote, 
didn't Sanders state that dismissal was appropriate for 
"collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, ha-
rass, or delay"? Taken in context, the passage on which 
you rely thus made it clear, I thought, that dismissal 
for "abuse of the writ" is only appropriate when a pris-
oner was free to include all of his claims in his first 
petition, but knowingly and deliberately chose not to do 
so in order to get more than "one bite at the apple." 
Your elliptical exposition of Sanders, in contrast, would 
allow dismissal in a much broader class of cases than 
Sanders was intended to permit. I am unable to join that 
expansion of the Sanders principle. 
My difficulty with your conclusion stems di-
rectly from my disagreement with the premise. You hy-
pothesize a prisoner who presents a "mixed" habeas peti-
tion that is dismissed without any examination of its 
claims on the merits, and who later presents a second pe-
tition containing the previously unexhausted claims. You 
equate the position of such a respondent with that of the 
"abusive" prisoner discussed in the Sanders passage. But 
in my view, the position of your hypothetical prisoner is 
substantially different. If the habeas court refuses to 
entertain a "mixed" petition -- as it must under your 
holding -- then the prisoner's "abandonment" of his unex-
hausted claims cannot in any meaningful sense be termed 
"deliberate," as that term was used in Sanders. It isn't 
"abandonment": it is simply that the prisoner will not be 
permitted to proceed with his unexhausted claims. rr-he-
is to gain "speedy federal relief on his claims" -- to 
which he is entitled, as you recognize with your citation 
to Braden -- he must proceed only with his exhausted 
claims. Thus the prisoner in such a case has no "purpose 
to vex, ' harass, or delay," nor any "hope of being granted 
two hearings rather than one." I conclude that when a 
prisoner's original, "mixed" habeas petition is dismissed 
without any examination of its claims on the merits, and 
when the prisoner later brings a second petition based on 














the previously unexhausted claims that had earlier been 
refused a hearing, then the remedy of dismissal for 
"abuse of the writ" should not be used against that sec-
ond petition. This conclusion is to my mind inescapably 
compelled by Sanders. 
My analysis is so at odds with yours that I 
cannot join your opinion as it now stands. But I repeat 
that this whole issue seems quite distinct from the ques-
tions that we really must address in the case before us. 
would you consider leaving for another day any discussion 
of the Rule 9(b) issue? I expect that to do so would en-
tail deletion of the paragraph on pages 10-11, and sub-
stantial revision of the full paragraph on page 5~ 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
. \ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
Dear Bill, 
.§upr.cm.c <!Jonrt of t~.c ~nildt .§tah,rf 
~curirmgton, 18. <!J. 20pJI>~ 
December 1, 1981 
No. 80-846 Rose v. Lundy 
Thank you for your memo of November 25. 
I have attached the second printed draft which 
quotes all of the applicable language from Sanders v. United 
States, 373 u.s. 1, 18 (1963). This may help with your 
concerns. The draft opinion merely notes that a criminal 
defendant runs a risk under Sanders when he fails to exhaust 
all his claims in state court. 
I have reorganized the portion which is of concern 
to you in Part III c of the draft in order to facilitate 
your separate comments, if you deem it necessary. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
,, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Bill, 
~uttrentt C!Jond a£ i~t ~nibh ~fafb( 
~a»lrhtgt.on, lfl. C!J. 2llpJI>.;l 
December 1, 1981 
No. 80-846 Rose v. Lundy 
Thank you for your memo of November 25. 
I have attached the second printed draft which 
quotes all of the applicable language from Sanders v. United 
States, 373 u.s. 1, 18 (1963). This may help with your 
concerns. The draft opinion merely notes that a criminal 
defendant runs a risk under Sanders when he fails to exhaust 
all his claims in state court. 
I have reorganized the portion which is of concern 
to you in Part III c of the draft in order to facilitate 
your separate comments, if you deem it necessary. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
' .
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:.rurip:ngLm. ~. <.Jt. 211bT)!~ 
CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . B RENNAN, JR . December 3, 1981 
.. 
RE: No. 80-846 Rose v. Lundy 
Dear Sandra: 
Thank you for your response to my memorandum of 
November 25, and thank you particularly for your re-
visions addressed to my problems. I can join all of 
your proposed opinion except Part III C if you found 
it possible to add the following sentence at the end 
of the full paragraph at page 5: 
11 This argument is addressed in Part C infra of 
this opinion. 11 
I shall shortly circulate a dissent from Part 
. I II C. 
Sincerely, 
Justice o•connor 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
~u;runu (!Jcurt o-f t~.e ~niit~ ~tai£.5 
1fta,£T'lrington, ~. ~· 2IlgT'l-~ 
December 3, 1981 
No. 80-846 Rose v. Lundy 
Dear Bill, 
In response to your memo of this date, I 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.Su.prtnu <!taurl of tlrt ~ta ..itatt.e 
.. a.efringt~ ~. <!f. 2llp>l~ 
December 10, 1981 
Re: No. 80-846 Rose v. Lundy 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, 
t .ft"'--v-
··. _ .. 




.:§u.vrrntt <qcurt cf t~t 'J.Ilnittlt ~tafNl 
'l11asJringtcn.l6. <q. 2ll.?'*2 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
December 14, 1981 
Re: No. 80-846 - Rose v. Lundy 
Dear Bill: 









.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
,§u:pr.elltl' <qonrt .o-f tip~ ~tt~ ;§ta:tcg 
Jfrasltittgwn. l9. Q}. 20~J!-.;l 
January 5 , 198 2 
Re : 80-846 - Rose v. Lundy 
Dear Sandra: 
/ 
Although I agree with most of what Harry has written , 
I think I will add a few paragraphs to explain my slightly 
different views. I will try not to hold you up too long . 
Respectfully , . ~ 
j -L 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
.§uprttttt ~aurl ttl firt ~b .§hdtg 
~rur~ ~. Q}. 2llbfJ!.~ 
March 1, 1982 
RE: No. 80-846 Rose v. Lundy: 
Dear Sandra: 
I 
I am making the necessary changes in my concurring 
and dissenting opinion to refer to your opinion as an 
opinion for the plurality on Part III C. I don't think 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
~uvrtmt (!Jourt of t~t ~niftb .$)tatt.s' 
'~lhurirngton, ~. (!f. 211~'1>~ 
March 4, 1982 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Case held for No. 80-846 Rose v. Lundy 
No. 80-6902, Stedman v. Maynard. 
This petition for certiorari is from the Tenth 
Circuit. Following his conviction in state court for 
murder, the petitioner filed a habeas petition under §2254 
claiming that one of the witness' testimony included 
inadmissible hearsay. The District Court dismissed the 
petition holding that even if the testimony erroneously had 
been admitted, the error was harmless. Four months after 
that decision, the petitioner filed a second petition 
claiming that the prosecutor knowingly had used perjured 
testimony from the same witness. The District Court denied 
relief on two grounds. First, the court found that the 
petitioner had discovered evidence of the perjured testimony 
nearly a year before the court had dismissed the first 
petition (but two weeks after the petitioner had filed the 
first petition). The court reasoned that since the 
petitioner's failure to raise the perjury issue in the first 
petition was inexcusable, the second petition constituted an 
abuse of the writ. Second, the court found the allegations 
factually insufficient to support the perjury claim. The 
petitioner argues here that he could not have appended his 
second claim to the first petition because that claim had 
not yet been exhausted in state courts. 
This case does not present a situation controlled 
directly by Rose since at no time did the petitioner submit 
a mixed petition. Whether or not the Rule 9(b) dismissal 
was proper, the case does not merit review because the 
perjury claim is frivolous. Thus, I recommend that the 
Court deny the petition. 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
.:§uvrtmt <qonrt of tqt ~nibh .:§tatt.s' 
~curltington, ~. <!J. 21lbi'*~ 
March 4, 1982 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Case held for No. 80-846 Rose v. Lundy 
No. 81-1038, Duckworth v. Cowell. 
This petition for certiorari is from the Seventh 
Circuit. Following his conviction for first degree murder, 
the petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus under 
§2254 making several claims, including that his counsel's 
conflict of interest violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
the effective assistance of counsel, and that his confession 
was involuntary. The court dismissed the other claims for 
failure to exhaust state remedies, but reached the merits of 
the conflict of interest and voluntariness claims, which had 
been exhausted in the state courts. On the merits, the 
court rejected the voluntariness claim, but found that the 
respondent's counsel suffered a conflict of interest in 
violation of the prisoner's Sixth Amendment rights. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that dual representation 
of a defendant and a prosecution witness was a per se 
violation of the Sixth Amendment (a holding that probably 
conflicts with Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 u.s. 335, 348 (1980), 
which held that absent an objection at trial, a defendant 
must show that "an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer's performance"). The State, as 
petitioner before this Court, has not raised the exhaustion 
issue. 
Because the petition in this case included both 
exhausted and unexhausted claims, I recommend that the Court 
grant the petition, vacate the opinion below and remand the 
case to the Seventh Circuit with instructions to remand the 
case to the District Court to dismiss the petition. 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~uvr~mt cqmxrt of t4r ~nittlt ~htb.s' 
1}ras'Irittgtlln, ~. cq. 2Dbl)!.~ 
March 4, 1982 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Case held for No. 80-846 Rose v. Lundy 
No. 81-5047, Rodriguez v. Harris. 
This petition for certiorari is from the Second 
Circuit. Following his conviction in state court on several 
counts of murder and one of robbery, the petitioner filed a 
prose petition#for habeas corpus under §2254 alleging that 
statements taken from him on the night of his arrest were 
involuntary and that trial counsel was incompetent for 
failing to try to suppress the statements at the suppression 
hearing and at trial. A federal Magistrate reviewing the 
petition recommended that the first claim be rejected on the 
merits, and that the second claim be dismissed because it 
had not been exhausted. At that point, the petitioner moved 
for voluntary dismissal of the entire petition. The 
District Court denied the motion for voluntary dismissal and 
accepted the Magistrate's recommendation for the case. The 
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court judgment in full. 
The issue presented, whether habeas petitions 
containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims should be 
dismissed, is the same issue as decided in Rose v. Lundy. I 
therefore recommend that the Court grant the petition, 
vacate the decision below and remand the case to the Second 
Circuit with instructions to remand the case to the District 
Court to dismiss the petition. 
Sincerely, 
- · - ..-Jt 
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